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PREFACE
USE OF THE TERM CA IN THIS DOCUMENT

This document describes the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities service
which has been developed as part of the WebTrust family of services.

Within the electronic commerce (e-commerce) industry, companies whose main business is to
act as certification authorities, or companies who have established a certification authority

function to support an e-commerce business activity, are routinely referred to as CAs or as
performing a CA function.
In Canada (and certain other jurisdictions), public accounting professionals, including the
practitioner’s who are licensed to perform WebTrust assurance services, carry the title of

Chartered Accountants, also routinely referred to as CAs or as being a CA.
In order to avoid confusion in this document, the term Practitioner, which is used widely in
accounting literature, is used to identify a Chartered Accountant or Certified Public Accountant

(CPA), or the equivalent, who is licensed to perform WebTrust assurance services.

The term CA is never used beyond this preface to refer to a Chartered Accountant,

The term CA is only used to denote a Certification Authority (CA) or to refer to the

Certification Authority function (CA function).

The term practitioner is used to denote a properly qualified and licensed Certified Public
Accountant (U.S.) or Chartered Accountant (Cdn.).
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INTRODUCTION
This document provides a framework for licensed WebTrust practitioners to assess the adequacy and
effectiveness of the controls employed by Certification Authorities (CAs), the importance of which will

continue to increase as the need for third-party authentication increases to provide assurance with respect

to e-commerce business activities.

As a result of the technical nature of the activities involved in

securing of e-commerce transactions, this document also provides a brief overview of public key

infrastructure (PKI) using cryptography, trusted third-party concepts, and their increasing use in ecommerce.

Confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation are the four most important ingredients
required for trust in e-commerce transactions.

implementation of PKI technology.

The emerging response to these requirements is the

PKI utilizes digital certificates and asymmetric cryptography to

address these requirements.
PKI provides a means for relying parties (meaning, recipients of certificates who act in reliance on those

certificates and/or digital signatures verified using those certificates) to know that another individual’s or
entity’s public key actually belongs to that individual/entity.

CA organizations and/or CA functions

acting as trusted third parties have been established to address this need. PKI uses public/private-key

pairs—two mathematically related keys. One of these keys is typically made public, by posting it in a
publicly accessible read-only repository for example, while the other remains private.

Public-key

cryptography works in such a way that a message encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted
with the private key, and conversely a message signed with a private key can be verified with the public

key. This technology can be used in different ways to provide confidentiality, authentication, integrity,
and nonrepudiation.

Cryptography is critical to establishing secure e-commerce. However, it has to be coupled with other

secure protocols in order to provide a comprehensive security solution. Several cryptographic protocols
require an independent trusted third party (the CA) to authenticate the transaction. CAs have assumed an

increasingly important role in secure e-commerce. Although there is a large body of existing national,

international, and proprietary standards and guidelines for the use of cryptography, the management of
digital certificates, and the policies and practices of CAs, these standards have not been applied

uniformly.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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To increase consumer confidence in the Internet as a vehicle for conducting e-commerce and to increase

consumer confidence in the application of PKI technology, the public accounting profession has
developed and is promoting a set of principles and criteria for CAs, referred to as the AICPA/CICA

WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities.

Public accounting firms and

practitioners, who are specifically licensed by the AICPA/CICA can provide assurance services to
evaluate and test whether the services provided by a particular Certification Authority meet these
principles and criteria. The posting of the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of

assurance is a symbolic representation of a practitioner’s unqualified report. Similar to the WebTrust
seal for business-to-consumer e-commerce, it also indicates that the Certification Authority’s customers

(subscribers and relying parties) can click on the seal to see the practitioner’s report This seal would be
displayed on the CA’s Web site together with links to the practitioner’s report and other relevant

information.
This is an initial version of the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification

Authorities. It is intended to address user (meaning, subscriber and relying party) needs and concerns

and is designed to benefit users and providers of CA e-commerce assurance services by providing a
common body of knowledge that is communicated to such parties.

We anticipate that future revisions

will be needed to update these criteria and related materials as the available technology and common
business practices evolve.

Your input is not only welcome, it is essential to help ensure that these

principles and their supporting criteria are kept up-to-date and remain responsive to marketplace needs.

The AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities are consistent with

standards being developed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF).1

1 The ANSI X9F5 Digital Signature and Certificate Policy working group is developing the X9.79 PKI Practices
and Policy Framework (X9.79) standard for the financial services community. This standard includes detailed
Certification Authority Control Objectives against which Certification Authorities may be evaluated.

An

International Organization for Standardization (ISO) working group has been formed to standardize X9.79 based on

international requirements in a new international standard. In addition, the American Bar Association’s Information

Security Committee (ABA-ISC) is developing the PKI Assessment Guidelines (PAG) which address the legal and
technical requirements for Certification Authorities. The PAG makes reference to the Certification Authority

Control Objectives that are detailed in the draft X9.79 standard and reflected in the WebTrust Principles and
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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OVERVIEW

What is Electronic Commerce (e-commerce)?

E-commerce involves individuals and organizations engaging in a variety of electronic business
transactions, without paper documents, using computer and telecommunication networks.

These

networks can be either private or public, or a combination of the two. Traditionally, the definition of e-

commerce has been focused on Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) as the primary means of conducting
business electronically between entities having a pre-established contractual relationship. Commerce has

also been conducted electronically for years in the form of credit card transactions authorized at the point
of sale, debit card transactions, and cash advances from automatic teller machines.

More recently,

however, with the development of the browser and HTML, the definition of e-commerce has broadened

to encompass business conducted over the Internet between entities generally not previously known to

each other. This is attributable to the Web’s surge in popularity and the acceptance of the Internet as a
viable transport mechanism for business information. The use of a public network-based infrastructure

such as the Internet can reduce costs and “level the playing field” for small and large businesses. This
allows companies of all sizes to extend their reach to a broader customer base.

What is a Public Key Infrastructure?
With the expansion of e-commerce, PKI technology is growing in importance and will probably be the

most critical enterprise security investment a company will make in the next several years. PKI enables
parties to an e-commerce transaction to identify one another by providing authentication with digital

certificates, and allows reliable business communications by providing confidentiality through the use of
encryption, and authentication, data integrity, and nonrepudiation through the use of digital signatures.

PKI uses public/private-key pairs-two mathematically related keys. Typically, one of these keys is made
public, by posting it on the Internet for example, while the other remains private.

Public-key

cryptography works in such a way that a message encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted

with the private key, and, conversely, a message signed with a private key can be verified with the public

Criteria for Certification Authorities. The Certification Authority Control Objectives referred to in each of these

documents were developed based on the existing body of ANSI, ISO, IETF, and other existing standards.
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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key. This technology can be used in different ways to provide the four ingredients required for trust in e-

commerce transactions, namely: confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation.
Using PKI, a subscriber (meaning, an end entity (or individual) whose public key is certified in a

certificate) has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair (meaning, a public key and a private key). The

subscriber’s private key must be kept secret, whereas the public key may be made widely available.

Using public key cryptography, the subscriber could send a message signed with his or her private key.
The signature can be validated by the message recipient using the subscriber’s public key.

The

subscriber could also encrypt a message using the recipient’s public key. The message can be decrypted
only with the recipient’s private key.

A subscriber first obtains a public/private key pair (generated by the subscriber or for the subscriber as a
service). The subscriber then goes through a registration process by submitting their public key to a

Certification Authority or a Registration Authority (RA), which acts as an agent for the CA. The CA or
RA verifies the identity of the subscriber in accordance with the CA’s established business practices (that

may be contained in a Certification Practice Statement), and then issues a digital certificate.

The

certificate includes the subscriber's public key and identity information, and is digitally signed by the

CA, which binds the subscriber's identity to that public key. The CA also manages the subscriber's
digital certificate through the certificate life cycle (meaning, from registration through expiration).

The following diagram illustrates the relationship between a subscriber’s public and private keys, and
how they are used to secure messages sent to a relying party.

Public
key

Private
key

Can only be
opened with
private key

Message
encrypted
with public
key

A transaction submitted by a customer to an online merchant via the Internet can be encrypted with the
merchant’s public key and therefore can only be decrypted by that merchant using the merchant’s private
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key—ensuring a high level of confidentiality. Confidentiality can also be achieved through the use of

Secure Socket Layer (SSL), Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), and other

protocols, such as Secure Electronic Transaction (SET).
What is a Digital Signature?

Digital signatures can be used to provide authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation.

Generally

speaking, if a customer sends a digitally signed message to a merchant, the customer’s private key is

used to generate the digital signature and the customer’s public key can be used by the merchant to verify
the signature. The mathematical processes employed are somewhat different depending on the kind of

asymmetric cryptographic algorithm employed. For example, the processes are slightly different for
reversible algorithms such as Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) and irreversible algorithms such the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA).
The following example illustrates the digital signature generation and verification process for a

reversible asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (such as RSA).
digitally signed message to a merchant.

Suppose a customer wants to send a

The customer runs the message through a hash function

(meaning, a mathematical function that converts a message into a fixed length block of data, the hash).
The customer then encrypts the hash with the customer’s private key to create the digital signature which

is appended to the message. A header is also appended to the message, indicating the merchant’s email
address, the sender’s email address, and other information such as the time the message is sent. The

message header, the message itself, and the digital signature are then sent to the merchant. The customer
can optionally send his/her public key certificate to the merchant in the message itself.

The following diagram illustrates the process of using a subscriber’s signing key pair to ensure the
integrity and authenticity of a message sent by the customer (subscriber) to a merchant.

Merchant

----

Header
+
Message

Digital Signature
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Public
Decrypts hash with
key
public key, re-creates
hash and compares to
validate digital signature

To determine whether the message came from the customer (meaning, authentication) and to determine
whether the message has not been modified (meaning, integrity), the merchant validates the digital
signature. To do so, the merchant must obtain the customer’s public key certificate. If the customer did

not send his or her public key certificate as part of the message, the merchant would typically obtain the
customer’s public key certificate from an online repository (maintained by the CA or another party

acting as the agent of the CA). The merchant then validates that the customer’s public key was signed by
a recognized Certification Authority to ensure that the public key actually belongs to the customer. Next,

the merchant decrypts the encrypted hash (meaning, the digital signature) using the customer’s public
key to reveal the hash. The merchant then runs the message through the same hash function to recreate
the hash. To verify the digital signature, the merchant compares these two hashes. If they match, then

the digital signature validates and the merchant knows that the message came from the customer and it
was not modified in transit. If the hashes do not match, then the merchant knows that the message was

either modified in transit or the message was not signed with the customer’s private key. As a result, the

merchant cannot rely on the digital signature.
Digital signatures can similarly be used to provide nonrepudiation (meaning, both authentication and
integrity that is provable to a third party, resulting in the fact that the signer cannot deny having signed

the message). For example, an online brokerage customer who purchases one thousand shares of stock

using a digitally signed order via the Internet cannot later deny (meaning, repudiate) having authorized
the purchase.

What are the Differences Between Encryption Key Pairs and Signing Key Pairs?

Nonrepudiation requires that the private key used to create a digital signature (meaning, the signing
private key) be generated and stored securely under the sole control of the user. Except for CA business

continuity purposes (as described in the next paragraph), there are generally no technical or business
reasons to back up a signing private key. In the event a user forgets his or her password or loses, breaks,

or destroys his/her signing private key, it is acceptable to generate a new signing key pair for use from
that point forward with minimal impact to the subscriber. Previously signed documents can still be
verified with the user’s old signature verification public key. Documents subsequently signed with the

user’s new signing private key must be verified with the user’s new signature verification public key.
Extra care is required to secure the Certification Authority’s signing private key, which is used for

signing user certificates. The trustworthiness of all certificates issued by a CA depends upon the CA’s

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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protecting its private signing key. As referred to above, CAs often securely back up their private signing

key(s) for business continuity purposes to allow the CA to continue to operate in the event that the CA’s
private signing key is accidentally destroyed (but not compromised) as a result of hardware failure, for

example.
On the other hand, it is often desirable that a key pair used for encryption and decryption be securely
backed up to ensure that encrypted data can be recovered when a user forgets his or her password or

otherwise loses access to his or her decryption key. As a result, a PKI typically requires two key pairs

for each user: one key pair for encryption and decryption and a second key pair for signing and signature
verification.

What is a Certification Authority?
In order for these technologies to enable parties to securely conduct e-commerce, one important question

must be answered. How will we know in the digital world that an individual’s public key actually

belongs to that individual? A digital certificate, which is an electronic document containing information
about an individual and their public key, is the answer. This document is digitally signed by a trusted

third party organization referred to as a Certification Authority (CA) and the basic premise is that the CA
is vouching for the link between an individual and their public key. The Certification Authority provides

a level of assurance that the public key contained in the certificate does indeed belong to the entity
named in the certificate. The digital signature placed on the public key certificate by the CA provides
the cryptographic binding between the entity’s public key, the entity’s name, and other information in the

certificate, such as a validity date. For a relying party to determine whether the certificate was issued by

a legitimate CA, the relying party must verify the issuing CA’s signature on the certificate. The public
keys of many common Root CAs (as later defined) are pre-loaded into standard Web browser software

(for example, Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer). This allows the relying party to verify
the issuing CA’s signature using the CA’s public key to determine whether the certificate was issued by a

trusted CA and to determine that the public key contained in the certificate has not been tampered with.

The purpose of a CA is to manage the certificate life cycle, which includes generation and issuance,

distribution, renewal and rekey, revocation, and suspension of certificates. The CA frequently delegates
the initial registration of subscribers to Registration Authorities (RAs) which act as agents for the CA. In

some cases, the CA may perform registration functions.

The CA is also responsible for providing

certificate status information though the issuance of Certificate Revocation Lists and/or the maintenance

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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of an online status checking mechanism. Typically, the CA posts the certificates that it has issued to a

repository (such as an online directory) which is accessible to relying parties.
What is a Registration Authority?
A Registration Authority (RA) is an entity that is responsible for the identification and authentication of
subscribers, but does not sign or issue certificates.

registration function internally.

In some cases, the CA performs the subscriber

In other cases, the CA might delegate the RA function to external

registration authorities (sometimes referred to as Local Registration Authorities or LRAs) that may or

may not be part of the same legal entity as the CA. These external registration authorities are required to

comply with the relevant provisions of the CA’s business practices disclosures, often documented in a
Certification Practice Statement and applicable Certificate Policy(s).

In performing a WebTrust for

Certification Authorities engagement, the practitioner must consider how the CA handles the RA
function and whether the RA function is within the scope of the examination. For example, a CA that

provides CA services to several banks, might delegate the subscriber registration function to RAs that are

specifically designated functional groups within each bank. The functions performed by these specific

groups would typically be outside the scope of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities examination
performed for the CA. In this case (in which a direct report is issued), the practitioner should disclose in

the WebTrust for Certification Authorities examination report those aspects of the registration process

that are handled by the CA and should examine the CA’s controls over those aspects.

In this same

scenario (in which an attest report is issued), the practitioner should examine the same CA controls;
however, the practitioner should disclose in the WebTrust for Certification Authorities examination
report those aspects of the registration process that are not handled by the CA.

The initial registration process for a subscriber is as follows, though the steps may vary from CA to CA.

The subscriber first generates his or her own public/private key pair. (In some implementations, a CA
may generate the subscriber’s key pair and securely deliver it to the subscriber.) Then the subscriber
produces proof of identity in accordance with the CA’s requirements and demonstrates that he or she

holds the private key corresponding to the public key (without disclosing the private key). Once the
association between a person and a public key is verified, the CA issues a certificate. The CA digitally
signs each certificate that it issues with its private key to provide the means for establishing

authentication and integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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The CA then notifies the subscriber of certificate issuance and gives the subscriber an opportunity to

review the contents of the certificate before it is made public. Assuming the subscriber approves the

accuracy of the certificate, the subscriber will publish the certificate and/or have the CA publish it and

make it available to other users. A repository is an electronic certificate database that is available on
line.

The repository may be maintained by the CA or a third party contracted for that purpose.

Subscribers may obtain certificates of other subscribers and certificate status information from the
repository.

For example, if a subscriber’s certificate was revoked as a result of the suspected

compromise of the subscriber’s private key, the repository would indicate that the subscriber’s certificate
has been revoked and should not be relied upon. The ability to update the repository is typically retained
by the CA. Subscribers and other relying parties would have read only access to the repository.

The following diagram illustrates the relationship between the subscriber and the RA and CA functions.
Registration function
(performed by CA
or separate RA)
Subscriber

RA

Provides proof
of identity

Links public key
to subscriber

May be housed
by CA or other
entity

Validates
subscriber
public key

CA

Issues certificate
and posts in
repository

Repository

Relying
Party

What are a Certification Practice Statement and a Certificate Policy?
A Certification Practice Statement (CPS) is a statement of the practices which a Certification Authority

employs in issuing and managing certificates. A Certificate Policy (CP) is a named set of rules that

indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with

common security requirements.

For example, a particular Certificate Policy might indicate the

applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for
the trading of goods within a given price range.
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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What is the Difference Between Licensed and Nonlicensed CAs?

Many countries, states, and other governmental jurisdictions have enacted or are developing digital
signature laws. In those jurisdictions that have digital signature laws and provide for CA licensing,

certificates issued by licensed Certification Authorities typically have a higher level of legal recognition
than those issued by nonlicensed CAs. For a number of jurisdictions, the use of certificates issued by
licensed CAs are provided specific recognition in those jurisdictions’ digital signature laws.

In the

United States, for example, several state digital signature laws require that audits of Certification
Authorities be performed as a requirement for licensing. One of the purposes of this document is to

provide standards that would meet the requirements of various governmental jurisdictions and the
marketplace.

What Is Cross-Certification and Why Does a CA Have to be a Trusted Third Party?
CAs may be linked using two basic architectures or a hybrid of the two: (1) hierarchical and (2) cross
certified (shared trust). In a hierarchical model, the secured central CA is deployed and subordinate CAs

may be set up for various business units. The Root CA validates the subordinate CAs, which in turn issue

certificates to the users.

Such a Root CA typically has more stringent security requirements than a

subordinate CA. Although it is difficult for an attacker to access the Root CA, one drawback to this

model is that the Root CA represents a single point of failure. In the hierarchical model, the Root CA

maintains the established “community of trust” by ensuring that each entity in the hierarchy conforms to
a minimum set of practices. Adherence to the established policies may be tested through audits of the

subordinate CAs and, in a number of cases, the Registration Authorities.

The following diagram illustrates the structure and relationships between certification authorities and
subscribers operating in a hierarchical model.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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In an alternative model, cross-certified CAs are built on a “peer-to-peer” model. Rather than deploying a

common Root CA, the cross-certification model shares trust among CAs known to one another. Cross
certification is a process in which two CAs certify the trustworthiness of the other’s certificates. If two

CAs, CA1 and CA2, cross-certify, CA1 creates and digitally signs a certificate containing the public key
of CA2 (and vice versa). Consequently, users in either CA domain are assured that each CA trusts the

other and therefore subscribers in each domain can trust each other. Cross-certified CAs are not subject
to the single point of failure in the hierarchical model. However, the network is only as strong as the
weakest CA, and requires continual policing.

In the cross-certified model, to establish and maintain a

community of trust, audits may be performed to ensure that each cross-certified CA conforms to a

minimum set of practices as agreed upon by the members of the community of trust.
The following diagram illustrates the structure and relationships between certification authorities and
subscribers operating in a cross-certified (shared trust) model.

In a hybrid model, both a hierarchical structure and cross-certification are employed. For example, two
existing hierarchical communities of trust may want to cross-certify each other, such that members of

each community can rely upon the certificates issued by the other to conduct e-commerce.

What Are Some of the Business Issues Associated with CAs?
Unless they are subject to governmental licensing and regulation, CAs may use different standards or

procedures to verify the identity of persons to whom they issue certificates. Thus a digital signature is

only as reliable as the CA is trustworthy in performing its functions. Consequently, a relying party needs
some way to gauge how much reliance it should place on a digital signature supported by a certificate

issued by a particular CA.
CA topology (for example, a hierarchical, cross-certified, or a hybrid model) is a developing issue.
Which model is most appropriate depends on the particular business circumstances. Although it is

important that public keys be certified, the issuance of nonstandard certificates can be a concern. For

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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example, if the broadly recognized International Telecommunications Union-Telecommunication
Standardization Sector’s (ITU-T) X.509 data format standard2 is not used, subscribers and relying parties

may be unable to process such certificates.

Implementing the cross-certified CA model (discussed

above) would also be very difficult.

THE WEBTRUST FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES SEAL OF ASSURANCE
The Web has captured the attention of businesses and consumers, causing the number and kinds of
electronic transactions to grow rapidly. Nevertheless, many believe that e-commerce will not reach its

full potential until customers perceive that the risks of doing business electronically have been reduced to
an acceptable level.

Customers may have legitimate concerns about confidentiality, authentication,

integrity, and nonrepudiation. In e-commerce, participants need the assurance of an objective third party.
This assurance can be provided by an independent and objective practitioner and demonstrated through

the display of a secured WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal on the CA’s Web site.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance symbolizes to potential relying parties that a

qualified practitioner has evaluated the CA’s business practices and controls to determine whether they
are in conformity with the AICPA/C1CA WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities,

and has issued a report with an unqualified opinion indicating that such principles are being followed in

conformity with the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria.

See Appendix A, “Illustrative

Examples of Practitioner Reports." These principles and criteria reflect fundamental standards for the
operation of a Certification Authority organization or function.

Practitioners as Assurance Professionals
Practitioners are in the business of providing assurance services, the most publicly recognized of which

is the audit of financial statements. An audit opinion signed by a qualified practitioner is valued because
these professionals are experienced in assurance matters and financial accounting subject matter and are

recognized for their independence, integrity, discretion, and objectivity.

Practitioners also follow

comprehensive ethics rules and professional standards in providing their services. Financial statement
assurance is only one of the many kinds of assurance services that can be provided by a practitioner.

Practitioners also provide assurance about controls and compliance with specified criteria.

2 ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997) was also standardized by ISO as ISO/IEC 9594-8.
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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Practitioners started providing Internet focused assurance services in 1998.
WebTrust for Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce.

The first service was

Under this service, practitioners provide

assurance services to evaluate and test whether a particular Web site meets the WebTrust Principles and
Criteria for Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce) for business and information privacy

practices, transaction integrity, and information protection.
In general, the business and professional experience, subject matter expertise (e-commerce information

systems security, auditability, and control) and professional characteristics (independence, integrity,

discretion, and objectivity) needed for such projects are the same key elements that enable a practitioner
to comprehensively and objectively assess the risks, controls, and business disclosures associated with ecommerce.

Obtaining and Keeping the WebTrustfor Certification Authorities Seal ofAssurance
The Assurance Process
The CA’s management will make assertions along the following lines:
Management has assessed the controls over its CA operations. Based on that assessment, in
Management’s opinion, ABC-CA has performed the following for its Certification Authority (CA)
operations at LOCATION during the period from January 1, 2000 through June 30, 2000, in conformity
with the AICPA/CICA WebTrustfor Certification Authorities Criteria:

•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices and provided its services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that—
Subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to
authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business
The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations is maintained

CA systems development, maintenance, and operation are properly authorized and
performed to maintain CA systems integrity
For an initial representation, the historical period covered should be at least two months or more as

determined by the practitioner. (For established CAs and CA functions, two months may be quite

sufficient, while for new CAs and CA functions, the practitioner may believe that a longer initial period
would be more appropriate). For subsequent representations, the period covered should begin with the

end of the prior period to provide continuous representation with reports issued at least every twelve

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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months. (In some situations, the practitioner may believe a shorter subsequent period would be more

appropriate given the business needs or expectations of relying parties.)
In order to have a basis for such assertions, the CA’s management should have made a risk assessment

and implemented appropriate controls for its CA operations. The WebTrust for Certification Authorities

Criteria and illustrative controls provide a basis for a risk assessment and a minimum set of CA controls.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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An independent, objective, and knowledgeable practitioner will perform tests of these representations

under AICPA or CICA professional standards3 and provide a professional opinion, which adds to the
credibility of management’s representations.
Comparison of a WebTrust for Certification Authorities Examination with Service Auditor Reports
Professional standards currently exist for auditors to report on controls of third-party service providers (a

service auditor’s engagement). Guidance for these engagements is set out in the AICPA’s Statement on

Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70, Service Organizations (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 324), and the CICA Handbook—Assurance Section 5900, “Opinions on Control Procedures at a

Service Organization.” A WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement differs from a service
auditor’s engagement in a number of ways including the following:
Purpose- WebTrustfor Certification Authorities provides a new framework for reporting activities of
certification authorities through auditor communication to interested parties including business
partners and existing or potential customers. SAS No. 70 and Section 5900 (Service auditor reports)
were designed for auditor-to-auditor communication to assist the user auditor in reporting on the

financial statements of a customer of the service organization.

Target of evaluation-WebTrust for Certification Authorities was designed specifically for the
examinations of certification authority business activities. Service auditor reports were designed for
service organizations in general.

Type of engagement-WebTrust for Certification Authorities requires reporting on compliance with
the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities. Service auditor

reports were designed for reporting on the design and existence of controls and the effective
operation of those controls when the report covers a period of time.
Examination standards-WebTrust for Certification Authorities follows the Statements on
Standards for Attestation Engagements (U.S.) and Standards for Assurance Engagements (Cdn.)

3 These services are performed in the United States under the AICPA’s Statement on Standards for Attestation
Engagements (SSAE) No 1, Attestation Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 100) or in
Canada under the CICA’s Standards for Assurance Engagements (also known as CICA Handbook, Section 5025).
Practitioners will need the appropriate skills and experience, training in the Certification Authority Trust service
offering, and a WebTrust business license from the AICPA, CICA, or other authorized national accounting institute
in order to provide the Certification Authority Trust services to their clients. The practitioner needs to perform an
“examination” (audit) level engagement in order to award the Certification Authority Trust seal. A review level
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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Service auditor reports follow generally accepted auditing standards.
Coverage of activities-WebTrust for Certification Authorities requires coverage of specific areas

defined by the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities,

including CA business practices disclosure, service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle
management activities), and CA environmental controls. Service auditor reports were designed for
reporting upon controls related to financial information

Linkage to authoritative standards-WebTrust for Certification Authorities provides uniform
standards derived from the draft ANSI X9.79 standard, (which is intended to be submitted to ISO for
international standardization).

Standards underlying service auditor reports do not specify the

control objectives that must be covered by the report.
Period of coverage of review-WebTrust for Certification Authorities requires continuous coverage

from the point of initial qualification. Qualification after compliance can be tested over a minimum
two-month period, with updates over a specified period (currently one-year maximum).

Service

auditor reports cover a period of time specified by the service organization, but do not require

continuous coverage.
In addition, this approach maintains consistency in the professional standards used for the WebTrust
family of reports. WebTrustfor Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce, WebTrustfor Certification

Authorities, WebTrust-ISP and WebTrust Third Party Service Provider (TPSP) reporting all use CICA
Section 5025 and AICPA AT Section 100 as reporting standards.
A table highlighting the differences between a WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement and

SAS NO. 70 and Section 5900 engagements is provided in Appendix E, “Comparison of CICA Section
5900, AICPA SAS No. 70, and AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Reports Covering

the Business Activities of Certification Authority Organizations,” of this document.
Obtaining the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Seal

To obtain the WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance, the CA must meet all the

applicable WebTrust for Certification Authorities Principles as measured by the WebTrust for

Certification Authorities Criteria associated with each of these principles. In addition, the entity must (1)
engage a practitioner, who has a WebTrust Business license from the AICPA, CICA, or other authorized

engagement is not sufficient.
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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national accounting institute, to provide the WebTrust for Certification Authorities services, and (2)

obtain an unqualified report from such practitioner.

Keeping the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Seal

Once the WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal is obtained, the CA will be able to continue

displaying it on its Web site provided:
1.

Its assurance practitioner updates his or her assurance examination of the assertion as described

below. The interval between such updates will depend on matters such as the following:
•

The nature and complexity of the CA’s operations

•

The frequency of significant changes to the CA’s operations

•

The relative effectiveness of the entity’s monitoring and change management controls for
ensuring continued conformity with the applicable WebTrust for Certification Authorities

Criteria as such changes are made
•

The practitioner’s professional judgment

An update may be required more frequently for a CA whose operation is expanding, changing

extensively and rapidly, or which is issuing high assurance certificates that are used for very
sensitive transmissions or high-value transactions, as compared to a CA that issues few certificates

and has a relatively stable operation. In no event should the interval between updates exceed twelve
months and this interval often may be shorter. (For example, in the situation of a start-up CA or CA

function, it may be more appropriate that the initial examination period be established at three

months, with the next review being performed six months after the WebTrust for Certification
Authorities seal is awarded, thereafter moving to a twelve-month review cycle.)

2. During the period between updates, the CA undertakes to inform the practitioner of any significant
changes in its business policies, practices, processes, and controls particularly if such changes might
affect the CA’s ability to continue meeting the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification

Authorities, or the manner in which they are met.

Such changes may trigger the need for an

assurance update or, in some cases, removal of the seal until an update examination by the

practitioner can be made. If the practitioner becomes aware of such a change in circumstances, he or
she would determine whether the seal would need to be removed until an update examination was

completed and the updated auditor’s report is issued.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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The Seal Management Process

NOTE: At the time of publication of this Exposure Draft of the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for
Certification Authorities, the seal management process for the WebTrust program is under review by the
AICPA/CICA. Should the process and arrangements be changed, it will be applied to the WebTrust for

Certification Authorities as well.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance will be managed using an independent
trusted third-party service organization (the seal manager) along the following lines:

•

The CA will need to apply for and receive a special Class 3 Certificate (the WebTrust for
Certification Authorities digital certificate) from the seal manager.

•

If the Certification Authority receives an unqualified report, the practitioner will notify the seal

manager that the seal can be displayed on the Web site of the Certification Authority with a
particular digital identification and will provide an expiration date.
•

The practitioner or seal manager also will provide an applet to the CA, which instructs a Web
page to communicate with the seal manager and, if authorized, display the seal and related hot

links to the practitioner’s report and other relevant information. The seal manager _will also
provide a special WebTrustfor Certification Authorities digital certificate to the CA.
•

If, for an appropriate reason, the practitioner determines that the seal should be removed from

the CA’s Web site, they will notify the CA and request that the seal and the related practitioner’s
report be removed from the Web site. The practitioner also will send a seal display authorization

removal notification to the seal manager. This will electronically revoke the seal and prevent it

from being displayed by the CA.
•

Unless an update notification is received, (1) the authorization to display the seal will expire, (2)

the Web site will be requested to remove the seal and the practitioner’s report and (3) the seal

manager will remove the CA’s seal display authorization as of the expiration date.
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Seal Authentication

To verify whether the seal displayed on a CA’s Web site is authentic, the customer can click on the seal
and a graphic display, which looks like a certificate, will appear. This display will provide the customer

with directions on how to view the special WebTrust for Certification Authorities digital certificate
issued by the seal manager using the browser.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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evidence that the WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal is valid. The digital certificate will indicate

(1) that it was issued by the seal manager, (2) that it was issued as a result of a WebTrust for
Certification Authorities examination, (3) who it was issued to, and (4) where the company awarded the
seal is located. Without this digital certificate, the WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal should not

be considered valid.

The Year 2000 Risk
The Year 2000 issue has attracted much publicity, and all entities should be aware of it. The issue has
arisen because many computerized systems use two digits rather than four to identify a year. Date

sensitive systems may recognize the year 2000 as 1900 or some other date, resulting in errors when
information using year 2000 dates is processed. Although January 1, 2000 has now passed, it is not

possible to conclude that all aspects of the Year 2000 Issue that may affect the entity, including those
related to customers, suppliers or other third parties, have been fully resolved.

It is important to

recognize that it is not and will not be possible for any Certification Authority to represent that it has

achieved complete Year 2000 compliance and guarantee its remediation. The problem is simply too

complex for such a claim to have legitimacy. The nature and complexity of the issue means that efforts

to deal with Year 2000 problems are effectively risk mitigation. Accordingly, no assurance regarding
Year 2000 compliance is provided as part of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities service.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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WEBTRUST PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES

In order to be understandable to the ultimate users-the subscriber and relying party, the principles set out
in the following sections have been developed with the relying party in mind, and, as a result, are
intended to be practical and nontechnical in nature.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities Principles
CA Business Practices Disclosure

The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management
business and information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with

its disclosed practices.

The Certification Authority must disclose its key and certificate life cycle management business and

information privacy practices.

Information regarding the CA’s business practices should be made

available to all subscribers and all potential relying parties, typically by posting on its Web site. Such
disclosure may be contained in a Certificate Policy (CP) and/or Certification Practice Statement (CPS),

or other informative materials that are available to users (subscribers and relying parties).
Service Integrity

The Certification Authority maintains effectivecontrolsto provide reasonable assurance

that the integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected
throughout their life cycles.

Effective key management controls and practices are essential to the trustworthiness of the public key

infrastructure. Cryptographic key management controls and practices cover CA key generation, CA key
storage, backup and recovery, CA public key distribution, CA key escrow (optional), CA key usage, CA

key destruction, CA key archival, the management of CA cryptographic hardware through its life cycle,
and CA-provided subscriber key management services (optional). Strong key life cycle management

controls are vital to guard against key compromise which can damage the integrity of the public key

infrastructure.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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The certificate lifecycle is at the core of the services provided by the CA.

The CA establishes its

standards and practices by which it will deliver services in its published CPS and Certificate Policy(s).

The certificate lifecycle includes the following:
•

Registration (meaning, the identification and authentication process related to binding the individual
subscriber to the certificate)

•

The renewal of certificates (optional)

•

The rekey of certificates

•

The revocation of certificates

•

The suspension of certificates (optional)

•

The timely publication of certificate status information (Certificate Revocation Lists)

•

The management of smart cards through their life cycle (optional)

Strong controls are essential to ensure that the registration process is operating effectively, as poor
identification and authentication controls jeopardize the ability of subscribers and relying parties to rely
on the certificates issued by the CA.

Effective revocation procedures and timely publication of

certificate status information are also critical elements, as it is critical for subscribers and relying parties

to know when they are unable to rely on certificates that have been issued by the CA.
CA Environmental Controls
The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance
that—
•

Subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to
authorized individuals, andprotectedfrom uses not related io the CA’sbusiness.

•

The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations is
maintained.

•

CA systems development, maintenance, and operation areproperlyauthorizedand
performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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The establishment and maintenance of a trustworthy CA environment is essential to the reliability of the

CA’s business processes.

Without strong CA environmental controls, strong key and certificate life

cycle management controls are severely diminished in value. CA environmental controls include CPS
and CP management, security policy management, security management, asset classification and

management, personnel security, physical and environmental security of the CA facility, operations
management, system access management, systems development and maintenance, business continuity
management, monitoring and compliance, and event journaling.
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria

In order to provide more specific guidance on meeting the WebTrust for Certification Authorities

Principles, the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria have been developed. These provide a
basis against which a CA can make a self-assessment of its conformity with the criteria and provide a

consistent set of measurement criteria for practitioners to use in testing and evaluating CA practices.

The WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria are presented under three principles-CA Business
Practices Disclosure, Service Integrity including key and certificate life cycle management controls, and
CA Environmental Controls.

Within each principle, there is a series of criteria which the CA’s

management asserts that it has achieved. Depending on the scope of services provided by the CA, a

number of the criteria may not be applicable. Those criteria that are considered optional, depending
upon whether the CA provides the related services are: - key escrow, certificate renewal, certificate
suspension, the use of smart cards, and the provision of subscriber key management services. If any of

these services are provided by the CA, then the criteria are applicable and must be tested by the

practitioner. If any of these services are not provided by the CA, then the criteria are not applicable and

no modification of the standard report is necessary.

In some situations, some RA services may be

outsourced to another party that is not controlled by the CA, and therefore the activities of which are not

included in the examination of the CA. In these circumstances, the standard report (United States only)
should be modified to specify the exclusion of the specific RA activities from the scope of the
examination as shown in Appendix A, Illustration No. 2. This may be accomplished by reference to the

CA’s business practice disclosures in which the CA specifies which RA activities it does not control. In
all instances, some RA activities will be performed by the CA and should be tested by the practitioner for

compliance with the controls disclosed in Principle 1 and the criteria specified in Principle 2.
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In performing, a WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement, the practitioner must gain an

understanding of the CA’s business model and services provided to determine which control criteria may

not be applicable. For each of the disclosure and control criteria, there is a detailed list of illustrative
disclosures and control procedures that might be followed by the CA to meet the related criteria. The

illustrative disclosure and controls do not necessarily need to be in place in order for a criteria to be met
in a given business circumstance and alternatives may be sufficient.
The CA Business Practices Disclosure criteria were derived primarily from the Internet

Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and

Certification Practices Framework—Request For Comments Draft (RFC 2527), which has been

incorporated into Annex A of the draft ANSI X9.79 standard. For specific key and certificate life
cycle management and CA environmental illustrative controls, in which the CA’s implemented

controls may vary depending on the CA’s business practices, such illustrative controls refer to

specifically required CA business practices disclosures included in Principle 1.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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2

1

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

3
Contact details and administrative provisions,
including:
• Contact person
• Identification of Policy Authority
•
Street address
•
Version and effective date(s) of each CP and
CPS

Community and applicability, including a description
of the types of entities within the PKI and the
applicability of certificates issued by the CA

Identification of each CP and CPS for which the CA
issues certificates

General

The Certification Authority discloses its business
practices, including but not limited to the following:

1.1 CA Business Practices Disclosure

CRITERIA

■
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The contact details for the CA ’s Certificate Policy are:
Policy Authority
ADDRESS
PHONE NUMBER
FAX NUMBER

The contact details for this CPS are:
CA Operations Manager
ADDRESS
PHONE NUMBER
FAX NUMBER
E-MAIL ADDRESS

Version 1.0

This CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) is applicable to all certificates issued by the CA. The
practices described in the CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) apply to the issuance and use of
certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for users within the CA domain.
This CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) is administered by the CA Operations Manager. The
CA ’s Certificate Policies are administered by the CA ’s Policy Authority. Contact information is listed
below.

The CA issues certificates in accordance with the CA ’s CPS dated DATE. The CA issues certificates that
support the following Certificate Polices Class 1 Certificate Policy, CA ’s Class 2 Certificate Policy, CA ’s
Class 3 Certificate Policy, and the Bank Consortium’s Certificate Policy.
The CA is established to provide certificate services for a variety of external customers. The organization
operates a single CA, which issues user certificates to all CA customers. The CA makes use of customer
designated personnel to act as agents to verify the identity of subscribers, in accordance with the indicated
Certificate Policy. Subscribers include all parties who contract with the CA for digital certificate services.
All parties who may rely upon the certificates issued by the CA are considered relying parties.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

5

6

Financial responsibility, including:
• Indem nification by relying parties
• Fiduciary relationships

Interpretation and enforcement, including:
• Governing law
• Severability, survival, m erger, and notice
• Dispute resolution procedures

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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A n y applicable provisions regarding apportionm ent
o f liability

CRITERIA
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In the event o f any dispute involving the services or provisions covered b y this CPS (o r other C A business
practices disclosure), the aggrieved party shall first n o tify the C A and a ll other relevant parties regarding
the dispute. The C A w ill involve the appropriate personnel to resolve the dispute.

Dispute resolution procedures:

Severance or m erger m ay result in changes to the scope, m anagem ent, and/or operations o f this C A . In
such an event, this CPS m ay require m odification as w ell. Changes to the operations w ill occur consistent
w ith the C A ’ s disclosed C PS m anagem ent processes.

Severability, Survival, M erg er, N otice:

The laws o f J U R IS D IC T IO N shall govern the enforceability and construction o f this CPS (o r other C A
business practices disclosure) to ensure u n ifo rm procedures and interpretation fo r a ll users.

The C A and its R A s are not the agents, fiduciaries, trustees, or other representatives o f subscribers or
relying parties.
G overning Law :

Except as expressly provided otherwise in this CPS, applicable C P, or b y statute or regulation, the C A ’ s
total lia b ility per breach o f any express warranties m ade under this CPS and/or applicable C P is lim ited to
direct damages having a m axim u m dollar am ount (m eaning, a lia b ility cap) o f ten thousand dollars. T h e
lia b ility cap set forth in this CPS or applicable C P shall be the same regardless o f the num ber o f d ig ital
signatures, transactions, or claims related to such certificate. A dditionally, in the event the lia b ility cap is
exceeded, the available lia b ility cap shall be apportioned first to the earliest claim s to achieve fin al dispute
resolution, unless otherwise ordered b y a court o f com petent jurisdiction. In no event shall the C A be
obligated to pay m ore than the aggregate lia b ility cap fo r each certificate, regardless o f the m ethod o f
apportionm ent among claimants to the am ount o f the lia b ility cap.
B y their applying for and being issued certificates, or otherwise relying upon such certificates, subscribers,
and relying parties, agree to indem nify, defend, and hold harmless the C A , and its personnel, organizations,
entities, subcontractors, suppliers, vendors, representatives, and agents fro m any errors, omissions, acts,
failures to act, or negligence resulting in liab ility, losses, damages, suits, or expenses o f any kind, due to or
otherwise proxim ately caused by the use or publication o f a certificate that arises fro m the subscriber’ s
failure to provide th e C A w ith current, accurate, and com plete inform ation at the tim e o f certificate
application or the subscriber’ s errors, omissions, acts, failures to act, and negligence.

E -M A IL A D D R E S S

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Compliance audit requirements including:
• Frequency of entity compliance audit
• Identity and qualifications of auditor
• Auditor’s relationship to audited party
• Topics covered by audit
• Actions taken as a result of deficiency
• Communication of results
9

•
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Significant deficiencies identified during the compliance audit will result in a determination of actions to be
taken. This determination is made by th e auditor with input from CA management. The CA is responsible
for seeing that corrective action is taken within sixty days. Should a severe deficiency be identified that
might compromise the integrity of the CA, CA management considers, with input from die auditor,
whether suspension of the CA ’s operation is warranted.

Topics covered by th e annual audit include the following:
• CA business practices disclosure
• Service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls)
• CA environmental controls

The qualifications of FIRM include the following:
• Adequate training and experience in PKI, security, auditing, and attestation
• Organizational independence from the CA
• Licensure by a professional organization requiring quality assurance measures such as peer
review, proper assignment of staff to engagements, and requirements for continuing professional
education

All subscribers and relying parties have access to the CA ’s repository.
An annual audit is performed by FIRM, an independent external auditor, to assess the adequacy of the
CA ’s business practices disclosure and the effectiveness of the CA ’s controls over its certification authority
operations.

Upon issuance, all public key certificates and CRLs issued by the CA are published in the CA ’s directory.

The CA ’s CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) is available at URL. The CA ’s Certificate
Policies can be found at URL.

_____

8

_
_
_
_

The CA may charge subscribers fees for their use of the CA ’s services. A current schedule of such fees is
available from the CA ’s repository at URL. Such fees are subject to change seven (7) days following their
posting in the CA ’s repository.

7

Fees, including:
• Certificate issuance or renewal fees
• Certificate access fees
• Revocation or status information access fees
• Fees for other services such as policy
information
• Refund policy_________________________
Publication and repository requirements, including:
• Publication of CA information
• Frequency of publication
• Access controls

_

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

RA obligations, including:
• Identification and authentication of
subscribers
• Validation of revocation and suspension
requests

Description of the conditions for applicability of
certificates issued by the CA that reference a specific
Certificate Policy, including:
• Specific permitted uses for the certificates if
such use is limited to specific applications
• Limitations on the use of certificates if there
are specified prohibited uses for such
certificates
CA and/or RA obligations:
• Notification of issuance of a certificate to the
subscriber who is the subject of the
certificate being issued
• Notification of issuance of a certificate to
others than the subject of the certificate
• Notification of revocation or suspension of a
certificate to the subscriber whose certificate
is being revoked or suspended
• Notification of revocation or suspension of a
certificate to others than the subject whose
certificate is being revoked or suspended.

CRITERIA
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The RAs (or the CA ’s RA function) are obligated to—
•
Verify the accuracy and authenticity of the information provided by the subscriber at the time of
application, in accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy.
•
Validate and securely send a revocation request to the CA upon receipt of a request to revoke a
certificate, in accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy.

The CA is obligated to—
• Conform its operations to the CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure), as the same may
from time to time be modified by amendments published in the CA repository
• Issue and publish certificates in a timely manner in accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy
• Revoke certificates issued by the CA, upon receipt of a valid request to revoke the certificate from
a person authorized to request revocation
• Publish CRLs on a regular basis, in accordance with the applicable Certificate Policy and with
provisions described in the CA ’s disclosed business practices (#35)
• Notify subscribers via e-mail (1) that certificates have been generated for them and (2) how the
subscribers may retrieve the certificates
• In the event the CA is not successful in validating the subscriber’s application in accordance with
the requirements for that class of certificate the CA shall notify the subscriber that the application
has been rejected
• Notify subscribers via email that the subscriber’s certificate has been revoked
• Notify other participants in the PKI of certificate issuance revocation through access to certificates
and CRLs in the CA repository

11

12

Certificates issued under the CA ’s Certificate Policy are limited to use in connection with BANK ’S
Consumer Internet Banking application. Certificates issued by the CA may not be used for any other
purpose.

’

10

Compliance audit results are communicated to the Board of Directors of the CA, CA
management, and the CA ’s Policy Authority, as well as others deemed appropriate by CA
management.__________________________________________________________

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

Verification of subscriber renewal or rekey
requests

18

CA key pair generation, including:
• What key sizes are required
• What key generation algorithm is required
• Whether key generation is performed in

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

17

16

15
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Hardware key generation is used and is compliant to at least FIPS 140-1 level 3.

The CA provides subscriber key management services including the following:
• Subscriber key generation
• Subscriber key storage, backup and recovery
• Subscriber key archival
• Subscriber key destruction______ •________
_________________________
The CA ’s signing key pair is 1024 bit using the RSA algorithm.

Version 1.0

Subscribers are obligated to—
• Provide information to the CA that is accurate and complete to the best of the subscribers’
knowledge and belief regarding information in their certificates and identification and
authentication information and promptly notify the CA of any changes to this information;
•
Safeguard their private key from compromise.
•
Use certificates exclusively for legal purposes and in accordance with th e relevant Certificate
Policy and this CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure).
•
Promptly request that the CA revoke a certificate if the subscriber has reason to believe there has
been a compromise of their private key corresponding to the public key listed in the certificate.
Relying parties are obligated to—
•
Restrict reliance on certificates issued by the CA to the purposes for those certificates, in
accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy and with this CPS (or other CA business practices
disclosure).
• Verify the status of certificates at the time of reliance.
• __ Agree to be bound by the provisions of limitations of liability as described in the CPS (or other
CA business practices disclosure) upon reliance on a certificate issued by the CA.
Certificates issued under the CA ’s Certificate Policy may only be used in connection with transactions
having a dollar value of no more than $100,000.

14

Verify the accuracy and authenticity of die information provided by the subscriber at the time of
renewal or rekey, in accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy.

The CA ’s repository function is obligated to— publish certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists in a
timely manner.

•

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

13

Whether the CA provides subscriber key management
services and a description of the services provided

Relying party obligations, including:
• Purposes for which certificate is used
• Digital signature verification responsibilities
• Revocation and suspension checking
responsibilities
• Acknowledgment of applicable liability caps
and warranties
Any applicable reliance or financial limits for
certificate usage
Key Life Cycle Management

Repository obligations, including:
• Timely publication of certificates and
Certificate Revocation Lists
Subscriber obligations, including:
• Accuracy of representations in certificate
application
• Protection of the subscriber’s private key
• Restrictions on private key and certificate
use
• Notification upon private key compromise

•

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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The CA ’s process for generating subscriber encryption key pairs uses the CA system software and is
designed to comply with FIPS 140-1 level 1.

Subscriber encryption key pairs are 1024 bit using the RSA algorithm.

For subscribers, the encryption key pair is provided securely to the user via an encrypted session between
the CA and the subscriber’s client software.

The CA ’s private signing key and expired (and revoked) CA public key certificates are archived.
For subscribers, the CA creates an encryption key pair and the corresponding encryption public key
certificate.

Escrow of CA private keys by an external third party is not performed.

The CA ’s private signing key is backed up only on hardware certified to FIPS 140-1 Level 3 and is stored
with two-person control enforced.

There is a separation of physical and logical access to the CA ’s root private key. Two individuals provide
dual control over physical access to the hardware modules; m of n secret shares held by other, separate
custodians on removable media are required for logical activation of the private keys.

Hardware cryptographic modules for generating and storing the CA ’s root key are certified to FIPS 140-1
Level 3.

The lifetime of the CA signing key pair is five years.

The CA ’s signing key is used to sign certificates and CRLs.

hardware or software
What standards are required for the module
used to generate the keys (for example, the
required ISO 15782-1/FIPS 140-1/ANSI
X9.66 level of the module)
•
For what purposes the key may be used
•
For what purposes usage of the key should
be restricted
• The usage periods or active lifetimes for the
CA public and the private key, respectively
CA private key protection including:
19
• What standards are required for the module
used to store the CA private key (for
example, the required ISO 15782-1/FIPS
140-1/ANSI X9.66 level of the module)
• Whether the CA private key is maintained
under m out of n multiperson control
• Whether the CA private signature key is
escrowed
• Whether the CA private signing key is
backed up
• Whether the CA private and public signature
keys are archived
Subscriber key pair generation (if the CA provides
20
subscriber key pair generation services), including:
• How the subscriber’s key pair is provided
securely to the subscriber
• What key sizes are required
• What key generation algorithm is required
• Whether key generation is performed in
hardware or software
• What standards are required for the module
used to generate the keys (for example, the
required ISO 15782-1/FIPS 140-1/ANSI
X9.66 level of the module)

•

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Whether certificate suspension is supported
Initial registration, including a description of the CA ’s
requirements for the identification and authentication
of subscribers and validation of certificate requests
during entity registration or certificate issuance:
• Types of names assigned to the subject and
rules for interpreting various name forms
• Whether names have to be meaningful or not
• Whether names have to be unique
• How name claim disputes are resolved
• Recognition, authentication, and role of
trademarks
• If and how the subject must prove possession

Certificate Life Cycle Management
25

24

For what purposes the key may be used
For what purposes usage of the key should
be restricted__________________ _____
21
Subscriber private key protection (if the CA provides
subscriber key management services), including:
• Whether the subscriber’s private key is
backed up
• Whether the subscriber’s private key is
archived
• Under what conditions a subscriber’s private
key can be destroyed
• Whether subscriber private keys are
escrowed by the CA.
CA public key distribution, including a description of 22
how the CA’s public key is provided securely to
subscribers and relying parties____________________
23
Key changeover, including a description of the
procedures used to provide a new public key to a
CA’s users

•
•

CRITERIA
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The CA issues certificates within a closed PKI. Trademarks and related naming issues will generally not

When there is a conflict in distinguished names such as a second “John Doe,” then a middle initial, middle
name, or other modification acceptable to the subscriber may be used to make the name unique.

All subjects in the CA ’s PKI are unambiguously identified in the naming hierarchy.

In all cases, names of subjects must be meaningful. Generally, the name by which a subscriber is
commonly known to the CA should be used. The CA does not support the use of pseudonyms in
subscriber common names.

The CA does not support suspension of certificates.
The CA has established a single naming hierarchy utilizing the X.500 Distinguished Name form.

Escrow of subscriber private keys is not performed by the CA.
The CA ’s public key is delivered in a self-signed certificate to subscribers using an encrypted session
between the CA and the subscriber’s client software, with an authorization code as a shared secret.
Authenticity and integrity protection is based on a MAC key derived from the authorization code.
The CA root signing private key has a lifetime of two years and the corresponding public key certificate
has a lifetime of four years. Upon the end of the private key’s year lifetime, a new CA signing key pair is
generated and all subsequently issued certificates and CRLs are signed with the new private signing key.
The corresponding new CA public key certificate is securely provided to subscribers and relying parties.

Subscriber encryption private keys stored by the CA are not destroyed.

The encryption key pair history for all users, including a complete history of all decryption private keys is
stored encrypted in the CA database.

Subscriber encryption private keys generated by the CA are backed up in the CA database. The CA
database is encrypted and its integrity is protected by master keys. Subscriber signature private keys are
generated by the subscriber and are not known or stored by the CA.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Registration requirements where external Registration
Authorities are used, including the C A ’ s procedures
for:
• V alidating the identity o f external
Registration Authorities
• A uthorizing external Registration A uthorities
• Requirements for the external Registration
A uthority to secure that part o f the certificate
application, certificate renew al, and
certificate rekey processes fo r w hich the R A
assumes responsibility
• H o w the C A verifies the authenticity o f

•

•

•
•
•

•

•

o f the companion private key for the public
key being registered
H o w the subscriber’ s public key is provided
securely to the C A
Authentication requirements for
organizational identity o f subject
Authentication o f individual identity
Required certificate request data
H o w the C A verifies the authority o f the
subscriber to request a certificate
H o w the C A verifies the accuracy o f the
inform ation included in the subscriber’ s
certificate request
W hether the C A checks certificate requests
for errors or omissions

CRITERIA

26

o f a private key
is proved by a certificate applicant

b y providing check values

as defined

in the
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The C A verifies the authenticity o f certificate request submissions received fro m an external R A b y
validating the R A ’ s digital signature on the submission.______________________________________

External R A s are responsible fo r identification and authentication o f subscribers and must secure their
private signing keys used fo r signing certificate applications, securely forw ard certificate applications to the
C A , and securely store any subscriber inform ation collected.

The C A authorized external R A s upon successful identification and authentication and approval o f the
external R A enrollm ent and certificate application forms.

The C A checks certificate requests fo r errors or omissions._______________
The C A requires that external R A s physically present themselves along w ith tw o form s o f identification to
an em ployee o f the C A .

The C A verifies the accuracy o f the inform ation included in the subscriber ’ s certificate request though
validation against a third-party database.

I f required b y the C ertificate Policy, the C A verifies the authority o f the subscriber to request a certificate
by checking w hether the subscriber is an em ployee o f a particular organization or association through
inquiry o f the organization ’ s H R departm ent or the association ’ s m em bership department.

certificate application form .

In subm itting a certificate application, at least the fo llo w in g inform ation m ust be submitted to the C A :
subscriber ’ s public key, subscriber ’ s Distinguished N am e, and other inform ation required on the C A ’ s

The requirements fo r authentication o f individual identity is defined b y the C ertificate P olicy <hot lin k to
C ertificate Policy.

organizational identity is considered im portant based upon the C ertificate Policy, the organization
identity is verified using a m ethod approved b y the C ertificate Policy.

If

C ertificate Policy.

Possession

apply to certificates issued w ith in this space.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

R A

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Rekey after revocation or expiration, including a
description of the identification and authentication
and rekey request verification procedures for rekey
after the subject certificate has been revoked________
Certificate issuance, including a description of the
requirements regarding the following:
• Issuance of a certificates
• Notification to the applicant of such issuance
• Certificate format requirements
• Validity period requirements
• Extension field requirements
• Key usage extension field requirements__
Certificate acceptance, including a description of the
requirements regarding acceptance of an issued
certificate and for consequent publication of
certificates ___________________ ___ ___________
Certificate distribution, including a description of the
CA’s established mechanism (for example, a
repository such as a directory) for making available to
relying parties the certificates and Certificate
Revocation Lists that it issues ___________________
Certificate revocation, including:
• Circumstances under which a certificate may
or must be revoked _______ ________

certificate request submissions received from
an external
____________________
Certificate renewal, including a description of the
CA’s procedures for the following:
• Notifying subscribers of the need for renewal
• Identification and authentication
• Renewal request verification_________
Routine rekey, including a description of the
identification and authentication and rekey request
verification procedures

CRITERIA

Certificates are issued to the subscribers upon successful processing of the application and the acceptance
of the certificates by the subscribers. Certificate format, validity period, extension field, and key usage

30

A certificate can be revoked for several reasons including suspected or actual compromise of control of the
private key that relates to the public key contained in the certificate, hardware or software failures that
render the private key inoperable, or failure of a subscriber to meet the obligations of this CPS and the

33
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A single repository operated for all subscribers and relying parties. All certificates issued by the CA and all
CRLs relating thereto, shall be published in the repository. The repository for this CA is provided by an
X.500 directory system. The protocol used to access the directory is the Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) version 2.

32

© 2000 AICPA / CICA

Once a certificate has been generated, it is maintained in a secure remote repository until it is retrieved by
the subscriber. Upon retrieval of the certificate from the secure remote repository, th e certificate status is
updated to reflect its status as accepted and valid.

31

extension field requirements are specified in accordance with the CA ’s disclosed certificate profile.

Authentication of the individual’s identity as defined in the CA ’s identification and authentication
requirements for initial registration need not be repeated unless required by the applicable Certificate
Policy. Subscribers will be limited to rekeying no more than twice before repeating the authentication
process defined in identification and authentication requirements for initial registration.
For subscribers whose certificates have been revoked or have expired, rekey is permitted if the
identification and authentication requirements for initial registration are repeated.

28

29

The certificate renewal process is similar to an application for a new certificate. However, the subscriber
only needs to provide information that has changed.

27

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

Identification and authentication procedures
required for revocation requests
Procedures used for initiation, authorization,
and verification of certificate revocation
requests
Revocation request grace period available to
the subscriber
Any variations on the preceding stipulations
in the event that the revocation is the result
of private key compromise (as opposed to
other reasons for revocation)
Procedures to provide a means of rapid
communication to facilitate the secure and
authenticated revocation of: (1) one or more
certificates of one or more entities; (2) the
set of all certificates issued by a CA based on
a single public/private key pair used by a CA
to generate certificates; and (3) all
certificates issued by a CA, regardless of the
public/private key pair used
Procedures for notifying the subscriber upon
revocation of the subscriber’s certificate
Whether the external Registration Authority
is notified upon the revocation of a
subscriber’s certificate for which the
revocation request was processed by the
external RA
How and when the subscriber’s certificate
status information is updated upon certificate
revocation

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

CRITERIA
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When a revocation request has been processed by an external RA, the external Registration Authority is
also notified upon the revocation of a subscriber’s certificate.

Upon revocation of the subscriber’s certificate, the subscriber is notified via email.

The CA ’s certificate revocation process supports the secure and authenticated revocation of one or more
certificates of one or more entities and provides a means of rapid communication of such revocation
through the issuance of daily CRLs (or if necessary, more frequent CRLs). The CA ’s system and processes
provide the capability to revoke (1) the set of all certificates issued by the CA that have been signed with a
single CA private signing key or (2) groups of certificates issued by the CA that have been signed with
different CA private signing keys.

Revocation requests for reasons other than key compromise must be placed within a maximum of forty
eight hours of the event necessitating revocation. In the case of suspected or known private key
compromise, revocation request should be made immediately upon identification of the event.

A subscriber can request a certificate revocation on-line, via email or by telephone to the CA. If the
request is made on-line and th e end entity supplies the correct challenge phase, the certificate is revoked
immediately. Certificate revocation requests made via email or telephone are processed on a daily basis by
the CA after the validity of such requests are ascertained. Validation procedures for telephone and email
revocation requests are defined in the Certificate Policy. Validated certificate revocation requests will be
processed no more than twenty-four hours after receipt. The Certificate Policy may define a shorter time
period for the processing of revocation requests.

Revocation may be requested by the subscriber, RA, or CA. Requests by Registration Authority personnel
to revoke a certificate require sufficient RA system access rights. Requests by subscribers to revoke their
own certificates require one of the following:
• A digitally signed message from the subscriber to the RA
• Personal presentation of the subscriber to the RA with a personal photo ID card
• Presentation of the passphrase created by the subscriber at the point of initial application
• Other means as provided in the Certificate Policy

related CP. Other circumstances for revocation may be stipulated in the particular CP and may relate to
changes in a subscriber’s relationship with the CA, such as a change in customer or employee status or a
change in the particular role of an employee.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Certificate suspension, including:
• Circumstances under which a certificate may
or must be suspended
• Identification and authentication procedures
required for revocation requests
• Procedures used for initiation, authorization,
and verification of certificate suspension
requests
• How long the suspension may last
• Circumstances under which the suspension
of a certificate may or must be lifted
• Authorization criteria to request the lifting of
a certificate suspension
• Any variations on the preceding stipulations
if the suspension is the result of private key
compromise (as opposed to other reasons for
suspension)
• Procedures to provide a means of rapid
communication to facilitate die secure and
authenticated suspension of: (1) one or more
certificates of one or more entities; (2) die
set of all certificates issued by a CA based on
a single public/private key pair used by a CA
to generate certificates; and (3) all
certificates issued by a CA, regardless of the
public/private key pair used
• Procedures for notifying the subscriber upon
suspension of the subscriber’s certificate
• Whether the external RA is notified upon the
suspension of a subscriber’s certificate for
which the suspension request was processed

CRITERIA
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The CA does not support certificate suspension.

Version 1.0

Upon the revocation of a subscriber’s certificate, the newly revoked certificate is recorded in the next CRL
that is issued.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

•

or submitted by the external RA
How and when the subscriber’s certificate
status information is updated upon certificate
suspension
Provision of certificate status information, including:
• If a CRL mechanism is used, the issuance
frequency
• Requirements on relying parties to check
CRLs
• On-line revocation/status checking
availability
• Requirements on relying parties to perform
on-line revocation/status checks
• Other forms of revocation advertisements
available
• Requirements on relying parties to check
other forms of revocation advertisements
• Any variations on the above stipulations
when the suspension or revocation is the
result of private key compromise (as
opposed to other reasons for suspension or
revocation)
• The CA’s requirements for archival and
retention of CRLs or other certificate status
information
• Whether copies of all certificates issued
(including all expired, revoked or suspended
certificates) are retained and disclosure of
the retention period
Certificate profile, including:
• Version numbers) supported
• Certificate extensions populated and their
criticality
• Cryptographic algorithm object identifiers
• Name forms (meaning, naming hierarchy

CRITERIA

36

35

Page 41

© 2000 AICPA / CICA

The following fields in the X.509 certificate format are utilized in the CA ’s PKI:
•
Version-Set to v3
•
Serial number-Unique values for each certificate in the CA domain
• Signature algorithm identifier—The algorithm used by the CA for signing the certificate
• Issuer-Identification of the certificate issuer
•
Validity-Start date and end date of the validity period are defined
Version 1.0

The CA archives and retains all certificates and CRLs issued by the CA for a period not less than ten years.

A subscriber is notified of the revocation of his or her certificate by email, postal mail, or telephone. The
CP may define other forms of revocation advertisements.

The CA does not support on-line certificate revocation checking.

As stated in the Certificate Policy, CRL checking is required for all relying parties.

The CA issues CRLs once a day at 11:59 PM. In addition, the CA may issue interim CRLs in the event that
personnel of the CA deem it necessary (meaning, in the event of a serious private key compromise) or as
dictated by Certificate Policy.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

39

CPS and CP administration:
• CPS and CP change control procedures
• Publication and notification policies
• CPS and CP approval procedures

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

38

37

Smart card life cycle management, including:
• Whether smart cards are issued by the CA
• If supported, a description of the CA’s smart
card life cycle management processes,
including a description of the smart card
distribution process______________
CA Environmental Controls

used to ensure that the certificate subject can
be uniquely identified) used for the CA, RA,
and subscribers names
• Name constraints used and the name forms
used in the name constraints
• Applicable Certificate Policy Object
Identifier(s)
• Usage of the policy constraints extension
• Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics and
• Processing semantics for the critical
Certificate Policy extension__________
CRL profile, including:
• Version numbers supported for CRLs
• CRL and CRL entry extensions populated
and their criticality

CRITERIA

Subject-Certificate subject’s distinguished name
Public key jnformation-Algorithm identifier (meaning, RSA with SHA-1) and public key
Issuer unique identifier
Subject unique identifier
Extensions
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Forty-five days prior to significant revisions to this CPS, the CA ’s Policy Authority will provide

Some revisions to this CPS may be deemed by the CA ’s Policy Authority to have minimal or no impact on
subscribers and relying parties using certificates and CRLs issued by CA. Such revisions may be made
without notice to users of the CPS and without changing the version number of this CPS. Revisions to the
certificate policies supported by this CPS, as well as revisions to the CPS which are deemed by the CA ’s
Policy Authority to have significant impact on the users of this CPS, may be made with forty-five days
notice to the users and a change in version number for this CPS.

The CA may alternatively support on-line certificate status and revocation checking services.
The CA does not issue smart cards to subscribers. Subscribers may, at their own discretion, purchase smart
cards and readers for purposes of key generation and storage.

The following fields of the X.509 CRL format are utilized by the CA:
• Version-v2
• Signature-Identities algorithm used to sign CRL
• Issuer-Identification of the CA issuing the CRL
•
This update-Time of CRL issue
• Next update-Time of next anticipated CRL issue
• Revoked certificates-Listing of information for revoked certificates

•
•
•
•
•

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Intellectual property rights

CA termination, including a description of the CA’s
procedures for termination and for termination
notification of a CA or RA, including the identity of
the custodian of CA and RA archival records
Confidentiality, including:
• Kinds of information to be kept confidential
• Kinds of information not considered
confidential
• Disclosure of information concerning
certificate revocation and suspension
• Release to law enforcement officials
• Release as part of civil discovery
• Disclosure upon owner’s request
• Other information release circumstances

CRITERIA
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Subscribers’ private signing keys are confidential and are not provided to the CA or RA.
Information specific to the operation and control of the CA, such as security parameters and audit
trails, is maintained confidentially by the CA and is not released outside of the CA organization
unless required by law.
Information about subscribers held by the CA or RAs, excluding that which is published in
certificates, CRLs, certificate policies, or this CPS is considered confidential and shall not be
released outside of the CA except as required by Certificate Policy or otherwise required by law.
Generally, the results of annual audits are kept confidential, unless disclosure is deemed necessary
by CA management.

Page 43

© 2000 AICPA / CICA

Version 1.0

The CA may disclose to another party information pertaining to the owner of such information upon the
owner’s request.______________________________________________________________________
Public key certificates and CRLs issued by the CA are the property of the CA. This CPS and the related

The CA will comply with legal requirements to release information to law enforcement officials.

Nonconfidential information, including.
•
Information included in certificates and CRLs issued by the CA is not considered confidential.
• Information in the certificate policies supported by this CA is not considered confidential.
• Information in the CA ’s disclosed CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) is not
considered confidential.
• _______________________________________________________________________________ When the CA rev
revoked certificate. This revocation reason code is not considered confidential and can be shared
with all other subscribers and relying parties. However, no other details concerning the revocation
are normally disclosed.

•

•

•

•

Confidential information, including.

This CPS and any subsequent changes are approved by the CA ’s Policy Authority.
The CA can only be terminated by the Board of Director’s of the CA. In th e event the CA is terminated, all
certificates issued under the CA will be revoked and the CA will cease to issue certificates. The CA will
provide no less than one month notice to all business units utilizing the services of the CA. Upon
termination, the records of the CA will be archived and transferred to a specified custodian.
Information, which is not considered by the CA to be public domain information, is to be kept confidential.

notification of upcoming changes on the CA ’s Web site.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
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Business continuity management controls, including:
• Whether the CA has business continuity
plans to maintain or restore the CA ’s
business operations in a reasonably timely
manner following interruption to or failure
of critical business processes
• Whether the CA’s business continuity plans
define an acceptable system outage and
recovery time and disclosure of the defined

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

43

Physical security controls, including:
• Site location and construction
• Physical access controls, including
authentication controls to control and restrict
access to CA facilities
• Power and air conditioning
• Water exposures
• Fire prevention and protection
• Media storage
• Waste disposal
• Off-site backup

CRITERIA
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The CA maintains a recovery site which is located approximately fifty miles from the CA ’s primary site.

Copies of essential business information and CA system software are performed daily.

Off-site backups are stored in a physically secure manner by a bonded third-party storage facility.
The CA has a business continuity plan to restore the CA ’s business operations in a reasonably timely
manner following interruption to, or failure of critical business processes. The CA ’s business continuity
plan defines twenty-four hours as an acceptable system outage time in the event of a major natural disaster
or CA private key compromise.

Waste is disposed of in accordance with the organization’s normal waste disposal requirements.
Cryptographic devices are physically destroyed or zeroized in accordance the manufacturers’ guidance
prior to disposal.

Media storage at the CA third-party processor is subject to the same degree of protection as the CA
hardware. Media storage under the control of the CA is subject to the normal media storage requirements
of the company.

All CA systems have industry standard fire prevention and protection mechanisms in place.

All CA systems have reasonable precautions taken to minimize the impact of water exposure.

All CA systems have industry standard power and air conditioning systems to provide a suitable operating
environment.

Physical access to the CA systems is strictly controlled. Only trustworthy individuals with a valid business
reason are provided such access. The access control system is always functional and utilizes proximity
cards and biometrics for access.

All critical CA operations take place within a physically secure facility with at least four layers of security
to access sensitive hardware or software. Such systems are physically separated from the organization’s
other systems so that only authorized employees of the CA can access them.

certificate policies are the property of the CA.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

•

time period(s)
How frequently back-up copies of essential
business information and software are taken
• Proximity of recovery facilities to the CA ’s
main site____________________
Event logging, including the following:
• How frequently the CA archives event
journal data
• How frequently event journals are reviewed

CRITERIA
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Event journals are reviewed at least on a weekly basis by CA management.

Version 1.0

As part of the CA ’s scheduled system back up procedures, audit trail files are backed up to media on at
least a daily basis. Audit trail files are archived by the system administrator on a weekly basis.

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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The integrity of the hardware/software used for key generation and the interfaces to the hardware and
software are tested before usage.

8
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CA key generation by the CA requires dual control by properly authorized personnel.

7

5

6

The CA generates its own key pair in the same cryptographic device in which it will be used or the key pair
is injected directly from the device where it was generated into the device in which it will be used.
Key generation uses a random number generator (RNG) or pseudo random number generator (PRNG) as
specified in an ANSI X9 or ISO standard._______________________________________________
Key generation uses a prime number generator as specified in an ANSI X9 or ISO standard.

Key generation uses a key generation algorithm as specified in an ANSI X9 or ISO standard as disclosed in
the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1 19)._______________________________________
Key generation results in key sizes as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 19).

4

3

2

CA key generation occurs within a secure cryptographic device meeting the appropriate ISO 15782-1/FIPS
140-1/ANSI X9.66 level requirement as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (See Principle 1, item 19).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA keys are
generated in accordance with industry standards.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.1.1 CA Key Generation

2.1 Key Life Cycle Management Controls

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

7

6

5

4

3

2
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Recovery of the CA private key is conducted in the same secure schema used in the backup process, using
dual control.

c.

In another secure cryptographic module such as a key transportation device using dual
control
The CA private key is backed up, stored, and recovered using dual control in a physically secured
environment.
Backup copies of the CA private keys are subject to the same or greater level of security controls as keys
currently in use.
CA private key backup and recovery is performed only by authorized personnel.

b. As encrypted key fragments using dual control and split knowledge/ownership

a. As ciphertext using dual control

If the CA private key is not exported from a secure cryptographic module and moved to secure storage for
purposes of offline processing or backup and recovery, then the CA private key is generated and used
within the same cryptographic module and is never exported outside of the cryptographic module.
If the CA private key is exported from a secure cryptographic module and moved to secure storage for
purposes of offline processing or backup and recovery, then the private key is exported in a secure key
management scheme including any of the following:

The CA ’s private signing key is stored within a secure cryptographic device meeting the appropriate ISO
15782-1/FIPS 140-1/ANSI X9.66 level requirement as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1
item 18).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA private keys
remain confidential and maintain their integrity.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.1.2 CA Key Storage, Backup and Recovery

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

6

5

4

3

2

Loading into a cryptographic module
Any of the methods used for initial distribution

d.
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Placing into a remote cache or directory

b.
c.

Direct electronic transmission from the CA

a.

Version 1.0

_________ c. Other secure means_____________________________________________________
The CA ’s public key is changed (rekeyed) periodically as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 23).__________________________________________________________
The subsequent distribution mechanism for the CA ’s public key is controlled as disclosed in the CA ’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 23)._______
If an entity already has an authenticated copy of the CA ’s public key, a new CA public key is distributed
using one of the following methods as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 23):

b. Embedding in an entity’s cryptographic module

The initial distribution mechanism for the CA ’s public key is controlled as disclosed in the CA ’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 22).______________________________________________________
CA public keys are initially distributed using one of the following methods as disclosed in any one of the
following CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 22):
a. Machine readable media (for example, smart card)

The CA provides a mechanism for detecting the modification of the CA ’s public key during the initial
distribution process (for example, using a self-signed certificate).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the integrity and
authenticity of the CA public key and any associated
parameters are maintained during initial and
subsequent distribution.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.1.3 CA Public Key Distribution

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

If necessary based on a risk assessment, the activation of the CA private signing key

2

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

If a secure cryptographic device is accessible and known to be permanently removed from service, all CA

3
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private keys stored within the device that have ever been or potentially could be used for any cryptographic
purpose are destroyed.

All copies and fragments of the CA ’s private key are destroyed at the end of the key pair life cycle.

2

Authorization to destroy a CA private key and how the CA ’s private key is destroyed (for example, token
surrender, token destruction, or key overwrite) are limited as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 18).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA keys are
completely destroyed at the end of the key pair life
cycle.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

2.1.6 CA Key Destruction

3

The activation of the CA private signing key is performed using multi-party control (meaning, m of n).

1

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA keys are used
only for their intended functions in their intended
locations.

is performed using
multi-factor authentication (for example, smart card and password, biometric and password).
The CA ceases to use a key pair at the end of the cryptoperiod or when the compromise of the private key
is known or suspected.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

2.1.5 CA Key Usage

2

If CA private signing keys are held in escrow, escrowed copies of the CA private signing keys are subject
to the same or greater level of security controls as keys currently in use.

If a third party provides CA private key escrow services, a contract outlining the liabilities and remedies
between the parties exists.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that escrowed CA
private signing keys remain confidential.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.1.4 CA Key Escrow (Optional)

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle
Management

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA cryptographic
hardware is not tampered with while stored.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA cryptographic
hardware is not tampered with during shipment.

2.1.8

4

5

4

3

2

1

5
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departure, and destination of each device

Version 1.0

a. Inventory control processes and procedures to manage the origination, arrival, condition,

Upon the receipt of cryptographic hardware from the manufacturer, authorized CA personnel inspect the
tamper evident packaging to determine whether the seal is intact.
Upon the receipt of cryptographic hardware from the manufacturer, acceptance testing and verification of
firmware settings is performed.
Upon the receipt of cryptographic hardware that has been serviced or repaired, acceptance testing and
verification of firmware settings is performed.
To prevent tampering, cryptographic hardware must be stored in a secure site, with access limited to
authorized personnel, having the following characteristics:

Policies and procedures require that cryptographic hardware be sent from the manufacturer via registered
mail using tamper evident packaging.

______________________________________________________________________________________
Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

Archived keys are periodically verified to ensure that they are properly destroyed at the end of the archive
period.

Archived keys are recovered for the shortest time period technically permissible.

3

2

All archived CA keys are destroyed at the end of the archive period using dual control in a physically
secure site.
Archived keys are never put back into production.

Archived CA keys are subject to the same or greater level of security controls as keys currently in use.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that archived CA keys
remain confidential and are never put back into
production.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.1.7 CA Key Archival

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA keys stored on
CA cryptographic hardware are destroyed upon
device retirement.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA cryptographic
hardware is functioning correctly.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that access to CA
cryptographic hardware requires a minimum of two
trusted employees throughout its life cycle.

CRITERIA

The installation of cryptographic hardware is performed in the presence of no less than two trusted
employees.
The removal of cryptographic hardware from production is performed in the presence of no less than two
trusted employees.
The process whereby cryptographic hardware is serviced or repaired with new hardware, firmware, or
software is performed in the presence of no less than two trusted employees._________________
The service or repair site is a secure site with inventory control and access limited to authorized personnel.

8

Diagnostic support is provided during troubleshooting of CA cryptographic hardware.

15

16
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If the device is being permanently removed from service, then any key contained within the device that has
been used for any cryptographic purpose is erased from the device.

Correct processing of CA cryptographic hardware is verified on a periodic basis.

14

13

The process whereby cryptographic hardware is disassembled and permanently removed from use is
performed in the presence of no less than two trusted employees.________________________
Devices used for private key storage and recovery and the interfaces to these devices are tested before
usage for integrity.

12

11

10

9

The handling of cryptographic hardware is performed in the presence of no less than two trusted
employees.

7

6

investigation and reports
_________ e.
Audit processes and procedures to verify the effectiveness of the controls______
Cryptographic hardware is stored in tamper resistant packages.

d. Incident processes and procedures to handle abnormal events, security breaches, and

c. All successful

or failed access attempts to the CA facility and device storage mechanism (for
example, a safe) are recorded in an event journal

b. Access control processes and procedures to limit physical access to authorized personnel

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
___________ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

____

•

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber private
keys stored by the CA remain confidential and
maintain their integrity.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA-generated
subscriber keys are generated in accordance with
industry standards.

2.1.9 CA-Provided Subscriber Key Management
Services (Optional)

CRITERIA

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

17
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recovery is performed only by authorized personnel.
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If the CA provides subscriber key storage, backup and recovery, and subscriber private key backup and

digital signature private key, once that key is delivered to the subscriber

If the CA generates key pair(s) on behalf of a subscriber, the CA ensures that subscriber’s private keys are
not disclosed to any entity other than the owner of the keys.
If the CA generates public/private digital signature key pair(s), the CA does not maintain a copy of any

Subscriber key generation performed by the CA results in key sizes as disclosed in the CA ’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 19).
Subscriber key generation performed by the CA is performed by authorized personnel as disclosed in the
CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 19).
When subscriber key generation is performed by the CA, the CA securely (confidentially) delivers the key
pair(s) generated by the CA on behalf of the subscriber to the subscriber as disclosed in the CA ’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 19).
Subscriber private keys stored by the CA are stored in encrypted form using a cryptographic algorithm and
key length based on a risk assessment and th e business requirements of the CA.

Subscriber key generation performed by the CA uses a random number generator (RNG) or pseudo random
number generator (PRNG) as specified in an ANSI X9 or ISO standard
Subscriber key generation performed by the CA uses a prime number generator as specified in an ANSI X9
or ISO standard.
Subscriber key generation performed by the CA uses a key generation algorithm as specified in an ANSI
X9 or ISO standard as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 19).

Subscriber key generation performed by the CA occurs within a secure cryptographic device meeting the
appropriate ISO 15782-1/FIPS 140-1/ANSI X9.66 level requirement as disclosed in the CA ’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 19).

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

For purposes o f this section, subscriber includes external Registration Authorities.

If the device case is intended to provide tamper-evident characteristics and the device is being permanently
removed from service, then the case is destroyed.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft A N SI X 9. 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycle s.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber keys
escrowed by the CA remain confidential.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber keys
archived by the CA remain confidential.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber keys
stored by the CA are completely destroyed at the end
of the key pair life cycle.

CRITERIA
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archive period.
Subscriber private keys escrowed by the CA are stored in encrypted form using a cryptographic algorithm
and key length based on a risk assessment and the business requirements of the CA.

If the CA provides subscriber key archival, all archived subscriber keys are destroyed at the end of the

16
17

Subscriber private keys archived by the CA are stored in encrypted form using a cryptographic algorithm
and key length based on a risk assessment and the business requirements of the CA.

If the CA provides subscriber key storage, all copies and fragments of the subscriber’s private key are
destroyed at the end of the key pair life cycle.

to destroy the subscriber’s private key (for example., key overwrite) are limited as disclosed in the CA ’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 20).

If the CA provides subscriber key storage, backup and recovery, controls exist to ensure that the integrity
of the subscriber’s private key is maintained throughout its life cycle.
If the CA provides subscriber key storage, authorization to destroy a subscriber’s private key and the means

15

14

13

12

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber
certificate requests are accurate, authorized, and
complete.

The Certification Authority maintains contro ls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscribers are
properly identified and authenticated.

2.2.1 Subscriber Registration

22 Certificate Life Cycle Controls

CRITERIA

9

Allow the detection of errors in the certificate application process.
b.
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Prove possession of the companion private key for the public key being registered.
The CA uses die public key contained in the requesting entity’s Certificate Request to verify the requesting
entity’s signature on the Certificate Request submission.

a.

The CA requires that the requesting entity submit its public key in a signed message to the CA for
certification. The CA requires that the requesting entity digitally sign the Registration Request using the
private key that relates to the public key contained in the Registration Request in order to—

8

7

6

5

4

3

The CA requires that an entity requesting a certificate must prepare and submit the appropriate certificate
request data (Registration Request) to an RA (or the CA) as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 25).
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the authority of the entity requesting a certificate as
disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 25).
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the accuracy of th e information included in the
requesting entity’s certificate request as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 25).
If external registration authorities are used, the CA validates the identity of external Registration
Authorities as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
If external registration authorities are used, the CA authorizes external Registration Authorities as disclosed
in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
The CA requires that an entity requesting a certificate prepare and submit the appropriate certificate request
data to the CA or an external RA as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 25).

The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the identity of the entity requesting a certificate as
disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 25).

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

Note: A requesting entity may be a subscriber requesting a certificate from an RA or CA, an RA requesting
a certificate from a CA, or a Subordinate CA requesting a certificate from a Root CA or Superior CA.

2

1

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

13

The CA accepts the Certificate Request from the requesting entity whose identity has been validated.

When the CA detects duplicate public keys, the Certificate Request is rejected and the original certificate is
revoked.

17

18

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The subscriber’s Certificate Renewal Request includes at least the subscriber’s distinguished name, the
serial number of the certificate (or other information that identifies the certificate), and the requested
validity period to allow th e CA or die RA to identify the certificate to renew.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificate renewal
requests are accurate, authorized, and complete.

6
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The CA or the RA verifies that the request, including the extension of die validity period, meets the
requirements as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 28).

5

4
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The CA or the RA verifies the existence and validity of th e certificate to be renewed.

3

2

The CA requires that the requesting entity digitally sign the Certificate Renewal Request using the private
key that relates to the public key contained in the requesting entity’s existing public key certificate.
The CA or the RA processes the certificate renewal data to verify the identity of die requesting entity and
identify the certificate to be renewed.
The CA or the RA validates the signature on the Certificate Renewal Request.

1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

15

16

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the RA ’s signature on the Certificate Request.
The CA or RA checks the Certificate Request for errors or omissions as disclosed in the CA ’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 25).
The CA verifies the uniqueness of the requesting entity’s distinguished name within the CA ’s domain.

14

CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the authenticity of the submission by the RA as disclosed in the

12

11

If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs submit the requesting entity’s certificate
request data to the CA in a message (Certificate Request) signed by the RA.
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that the RA secure that part of the certificate application process
for which it (the RA) assumes responsibility as disclosed in th e CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item
26).
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs record their actions in an event journal.

10

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)

2.2.2 Certificate Renewal (Optional)

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

13

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The subscriber’s Certificate Rekey Request includes at least the subscriber’s distinguished name, the serial
number of the certificate, and the requested validity period to allow the CA or the RA to identify the
certificate to rekey.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificate rekey
requests and are accurate, authorized, and complete.
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The CA or the RA verifies the existence and validity of the certificate to be rekeyed.

3

2

The CA requires that the requesting entity digitally sign the Certificate Rekey Request using the private key
that relates to the public key contained in the requesting entity’s existing public key certificate.
The CA or the RA processes the Certificate Rekey Request to verify the identity of the requesting entity
and identify the certificate to be rekeyed.
The CA or the RA validates the signature on the Certificate Rekey Request.

1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

14

That the request, including the extension of the validity period, meets the requirements as
disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 27)

The CA or RA notifies subscribers prior to the expiration of their certificate of the need for renewal as
disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 27).
Prior to certificate generation and issuance of renewed certificates, the CA or RA verifies the following:
a. The signature on the certificate renewal data submission

12

c.

The CA or RA checks the Certificate Renewal Request for errors or omissions.

11

The existence and validity of the certificate to be renewed

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the RA ’s signature on the Certificate Renewal Request.

10

b.

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the authenticity of the submission by the RA.

8

9

If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs submit th e requesting entity’s certificate
request data to the CA in a message (Certificate Renewal Request) signed by the RA.
When an external RA is used, th e RA secures that part of the certificate renewal process for which it (the
RA) assumes responsibility as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs record their actions in an event journal.

7

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.2.3 Certificate Rekey

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

(

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificate rekey
requests following certificate revocation or expiration
are accurate, authorized, and complete.

CRITERIA

Prior to the generation and issuance of rekeyed certificates, the CA or RA verifies the following:
a.
The signature on the certificate renewal data submission

14

15

The CA or RA notifies subscribers prior to the expiration of their certificate of the need for rekey.

13

c.

Page 57

© 2000 AICPA / CICA

Version 1.0

That the request, including the extension of the validity period, meets the requirements as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 28)
Following the revocation or expiration of a subscriber’s existing certificate, the subscriber is required to
follow the CA ’s subscriber registration procedures to obtain a new rekeyed certificate (as specified in
§2.2.1, Subscriber Registration) as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item29).

The existence and validity of the certificate to be renewed,

The CA or the RA checks the Certificate Rekey Request for errors or omissions.

12

b.

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the RA ’s signature on the Certificate Rekey Request.

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the authenticity of the submission by the RA.

The CA or the RA verifies that the Certificate Rekey Request meets the requirements as disclosed in the
CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 28).
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs submit the requesting entity’s certificate rekey
request to the CA in a message signed by the RA.
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that the RA secure that part of the certificate rekey process for
which it (the RA) assumes responsibility as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs record their actions in an event journal.

11

10

9

8

7

6

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2
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The CA issues the certificate after the certificate has been accepted by the requesting entity as disclosed in
the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 31).
When an RA is used, the CA notifies the RA when a certificate is issued to a subscriber for whom the RA
submitted a certificate request.
For certificate renewals, the CA generates and signs a new instance of the certificate, differing from the
previous certificate only by the validity period and the CA signature only if the CA has approved the
certificate renewal request as specified in §2.2.2 Certificate Renewal.
For rekeyed certificates, the CA generates and signs a new certificate only if the CA has approved the
certificate rekey request as specified in §2.2.3 Certificate Rekey.
The CA issues an out-of-band notification to the requesting entity when a certificate is issued.

The CA generates certificates in accordance with ISO 9594/X.509 as disclosed in the CA ’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 30).
Validity periods are set in accordance with ISO 9594/X.509 as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 30).
Extension fields are set in accordance with ISO 9594/X.509 as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 30).
Key usage extension fields are set in accordance with ISO 9594/X.509 as disclosed in the CA’s business
practices (Principle 1 #30).
The CA signs the requesting entity ’s certificate with the CA ’s private signing key.

The CA generates certificates using the appropriate certificate format as disclosed in the CA ’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 30).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that new, renewed, and
rekeyed certificates are generated and issued in
accordance with the CA’s disclosed business
practices.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.2.4 Certificate Issuance

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

The perform ance o f the C A ’ s repository or alternative distribution m echanism is m onitored and managed.
The integrity o f the repository or alternative distribution mechanism is m aintained.

4
5

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

5

4

3

2

A ll certificates

issued b y a C A , regardless

o f the public/private k e y p air used
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The C A verifies or requires that the external R A v e rify the identity and authority o f the entity requesting
revocation o f a certificate as disclosed in the C A ’ s business practices (P rinciple 1, item 3 3 ).
I f an external R A accepts revocation requests, the C A requires that the R A subm it certificate revocation
requests to the C A in an authenticated m anner as disclosed in the C A ’ s business practices (Principle 1, item
33).
I f an external R A accepts and forwards revocation requests to the C A , the C A provides an authenticated
acknowledgem ent o f the revocation to the requesting R A as disclosed in the C A ’ s business practices
(Principle 1, item 33). ________________________________________________________________________________
The C A updates the C ertificate Revocation List (C R L ) upon certificate revocation as disclosed in the C A ’ s
business practices (Principle 1, item 33).

c.

The set o f a ll certificates issued b y a C A based on a single public/private key pair used b y a

b.

C A to generate certificates

One or m ore certificates o f one or m ore entities

a.

A s disclosed in the C A ’ s business practices (Principle 1, item 33), the C A provides a means o f rapid
com m unication to facilitate th e secure and authenticated revocation o f th e follow ing:

The Certification A uthority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificates are
revoked based on authorized and validated certificate
revocation requests.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

3

U pon certificate issuance, the C A posts certificates to the repository or alternative distribution m echanism
as disclosed in the C A ’ s business practices (Principle 1, item 32).
O n ly authorized C A personnel may administer the C A ’ s repository or alternative distribution mechanism.

The C A makes the certificates issued by the C A available to relying parties using an established mechanism
(fo r exam ple, a repository such as a directory) as disclosed in the C A ’ s business practices (Principle 1, item
32).

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

2

1

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.2.6 Certificate Revocation

The C ertification A uthority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that, upon issuance,
complete and accurate certificates are available to
subscribers and relying parties.

2.2.5 Certificate Distribution

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - T h e C e rtific a tio n A u th o rity m a in ta in s e ffe c tiv e co n tro ls to p ro v id e re a s o n a b le assurance th a t th e in te g rity o f k e y s a n d
c e rtific a te s it m anages is established an d p ro te c te d th ro u g h o u t th e ir life cycles.

The CA or RA provides an authenticated acknowledgement of the revocation to the entity whose certificate
has been revoked as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 33).
Where certificate renewal is supported, when a certificate is revoked, all valid instances of the certificate
are also revoked.

7

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

One or more certificates of one or more entities

b.
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The set of all certificates issued by a CA based on a single public/private key pair used by a
CA to generate certificates
c.
All certificates issued by a CA, regardless of the public/private key pair used
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify th e identity and authority of the entity requesting
suspension of a certificate as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
If an external RA accepts suspension requests, the RA submits certificate suspension requests to the CA in
an authenticated manner as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
The CA or RA notifies the End Entity in the event of a certificate suspension as disclosed in the CA ’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
Certificate suspension requests are processed and validated as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 34).
The CA updates the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) upon certificate suspension as disclosed in the CA ’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
Certificates are suspended only for the allowable length of time as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 34).
Once a certificate suspension (hold) has been issued, the suspension is handled in one of the following
three ways:
a. An entry for the suspended certificate remains on the CRL with no further action, causing
users to reject transactions issued during the hold period
b. The CRL entry for the suspended certificate is replaced by a revocation entry for the same
certificate

a.

As disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 34), the CA provides a means of rapid
communication are in place to facilitate the secure and authenticated suspension of the following:

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificates are
suspended based on authorized and validated
certificate suspension requests.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

8

All certificate revocation requests and their outcome are recorded in an event journal by the CA.

6

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

2.2.7 Certificate Suspension (Optional)

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

CAs include a monotonically increasing sequence number for each CRL issued by that CA (for example, 1,
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Old CRLs are retained for the appropriate period of time as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 35).__________________________________________________________________
Whether certificates expire, are revoked or are suspended, copies of certificates are retained for the
appropriate period of time as disclosed in the CA ’s disclosed business practices (Principle 1, item 35).

10
11

The CRL contains entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CA.

2 , 3)._______________________________________________________________________________
9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

The CA digitally signs each CRL that it issues so that entities can validate the integrity of the CRL and the
date of issuance.
The CA issues CRLs at regular intervals, even if no changes have occurred since the last issuance, as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 35).
Certificate status information is available to all relevant entities as disclosed in th e CA ’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 35).
At a minimum, a CRL entry identifying a revoked certificate remains on the CRL until the end of the
certificate’s validity period.
If certificate suspension is supported, a certificate suspension (hold) entry, with its original action date and
expiration date remains on the CRL until the normal expiration of the certificate.____________ ___
CRLs are archived as disclosed in the CAs business practices (Principle 1, item 35).

The CA makes each Certificate Revocation List (CRL) issued by the CA available to relying parties using
an established mechanism (for example, a repository such as a directory) as disclosed in the CAs business
practices (Principle 1, item 35).

1

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that complete and
accurate Certificate Revocation Lists are generated
and issued on a timely basis.

c.
The suspended certificate is explicitly released and the entry removed from the CRL
A certificate suspension (hold) entry remains on the CRL until the expiration of the underlying certificate
or the expiration of the suspension, whichever is first.
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the identity and authority of the entity requesting
that the suspension of a certificate be lifted.
Certificate suspensions and the lifting of certificate suspensions are recorded in an event journal.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

11

10

9

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
___________ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)________

2.2.8 Certificate Revocation List Processing

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

Web Trustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that smart cards are
securely stored and distributed by the CA.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that smart card usage is
enabled by the CA prior to smart card issuance.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that smart card
Application Data File (ADF) preparation is securely
controlled by the CA.

Smart card personalization and CDF activation are logged by the CA.

3

4

After ADF activation, the smart card indicates an ADF activated status.
The CA logs ADF allocation, personalization, and activation.

8

9
10
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Smart cards are securely stored prior to distribution.

A smart card is unusable unless the CDF is m an activated or a reactivated state.

12
13

A smart card is not issued unless the card has been personalized.

11
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The CA, as the application supplier, controls ADF personalization (the loading of ADF related keys and
data).
The CA, as the card issuer, controls ADF activation (preparation of an ADF for use by the cardholder)
using a securely controlled process.
An ADF can only be activated when the CDF is either in an activated or a reactivated state.

6
7

Specific application supplier data stored in the smart card is located in the application data file (ADF).
Application Data File (ADF) allocation (the allocation of memory areas in an integrated circuit) is securely
controlled by the CA, as the card issuer.

5

2

Common data that identify the smart card, the card issuer, and the cardholder are stored by the card issuer
in the smart card Common Data File (CDF). Common Data File (CDF) activation is performed by the CA,
as the card issuer, using a securely controlled process.
After CDF activation, the smart card indicates a CDF activated status.

The CA, as the card issuer, controls smart card personalization (the loading of Common Data File (CDF)
data and its related cryptographic keys).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that smart card
preparation is securely controlled by the CA.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to, the following:

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

o f keys and

2.2.9 Smart Card Life Cycle Management (Optional)

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the use of smart
cards is securely terminated for smart cards returned
to the CA.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that smart card
deactivation and reactivation are securely controlled
by the CA.

CRITERIA
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ADF deactivation, CDF deactivation, CDF reactivation, and ADF reactivation are logged.

20

Common Data File (CDF) termination is controlled by the CA, as the card issuer.

ADF reactivation is conducted under the control of the CA, as th e application supplier.

19

22

CDF reactivation is conducted under the control of the CA, as the card issuer.

18

The CA, as the application supplier, controls ADF termination.

Common Data File (CDF) deactivation can be performed only by the CA, as the card issuer.

17

21

Application Data File (ADF) deactivation can be performed only by the CA, as the application supplier.

Receipt, activation, and distribution of smart cards are logged in an event journal. An inventory of smart
cards and their status is maintained.________ _______
Smart cards are securely distributed as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 38).

16

15

14

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
___________ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)___________

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity o f keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

CA environmental controls

c.
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The CA makes available the Certificate Policies supported by the CA to all appropriate subscribers and
relying parties.
Revisions to Certificate Policy(s) supported by the CA are made available to subscribers and relying
parties.

Certificate Policy(s) are approved and modified in accordance with a defined review process, including
responsibilities for maintaining the Certificate Policy(s).______________________________________
A defined review process exists to ensure that Certificate Policy(s) are supported by the CA ’s CPS.

The CA ’s CPS is approved and modified in accordance with a defined review process, including
responsibilities for maintaining the CPS.
The CA makes available its public Certification Practice Statement (CPS) to all appropriate subscribers and
relying parties.
Revisions to the CA ’s CPS are made available to subscribers and relying parties.

Certificate life cycle management controls

b.

There is a Policy Management Authority with final authority and responsibility for specifying and
approving Certificate Policy(s).
The Policy Management Authority (or equivalent group) has performed an assessment to evaluate business
risks and determine the security requirements and operational procedures to be included in the applicable
Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement for the following:
a. Key life cycle management controls

The CA organization has a management group with final authority and responsibility for specifying and
approving the CA ’s Certification Practice Statement (CPS).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the CA’s CPS and
Certificate Policy (CP) management controls are
effective.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

3.1 Certification Practice Statement and
Certificate Policy Management

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that information
security is properly managed within the organization.

An information security policy document (security policy) is approved by management, published, and
communicated, as appropriate, to all employees.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that management
direction and support for information security is
provided.

Prevention and detection of viruses and other malicious software
Business continuity management

c.

d.

The security poli

e.______________________________________________________ The consequences of security policy violati
The security policy contains a definition of general and specific responsibilities for information security
management, including reporting security incidents._________________ ________________________
The security policy contains references to documentation which supports the policy.

Security education requirements

b.

requirements of particular importance to the organization, including the following:
a.
Compliance with legislative and contractual requirements

security

9

8
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A management group or security committee exists to coordinate the implementation of information security
measures.

policy._______________________________________________________________________________
Senior management and/or a high level management information security committee ensures there is clear
direction and visible management support for security initiatives.

7____________________________________________________________________________________________ There is a def

6

5

4

information security.___________________________________________________________________

3____________________________________________________________________________________________ The

importance of security as an enabling mechanism for information sharing.________________________

2____________________________________________________________________________________________ The security

1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
_______________ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)___________

3.2 Security Management

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the security of
information is maintained when the responsibility for
CA functions has been outsourced to another
organization or entity.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the security of CA
facilities, systems, and information assets accessed by
third parties is maintained.

CRITERIA

16

15

14

13

12

11

10
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The Certification Authority has responsibility for the aggregate completion of the four PKI roles of Issuer,
Certificate Manufacturer, Registrar and Repository. The Certification Authority (CA) may choose to the
delegate a portion of th e roles and respective functions in any manner it chooses, but the entity designated
as th e Certification Authority is ultimately responsible for the completion of both the functions identified
and the definition and maintenance of a statement of its certification practices (meaning, CPS).

is a business need for the CA to allow third-party access to CA facilities and systems, a risk
assessment is performed to determine security implications and specific control requirements.
Arrangements involving third-party access to CA facilities and systems are based on a formal contract
containing all necessary security requirements.___________________________________________
If the CA outsources the management and control of all or some of its information systems, networks,
and/or desktop environments, the security requirements of the CA are addressed in a contract agreed
between the parties.

If there

Procedures exist and are followed to control physical and logical access to CA facilities and systems by
third parties including on-site contractors and trading partners or joint ventures.

Responsibilities for the protection of individual assets and for carrying out specific security processes are
clearly defined.
A management authorization process for new information processing facilities exists and is followed.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

The CA has implemented information classification and associated protective controls for information that
take account of business needs for sharing or restricting information, and the business impacts associated
with such needs.
___________________________________
Procedures are defined to ensure that information labeling and handling is performed in accordance with
the CA ’s information classification scheme.

3

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

3

2
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Verification checks on permanent staff are performed at the time of job application. The CA ’s policies and
procedures specify the background checks and clearance procedures required for the personnel filling th e
trusted roles, and other personnel, including janitorial staff.
____________________________
Employees sign a confidentiality (nondisclosure) agreement as part of their initial terms and conditions of
employment.

Security roles and responsibilities, as specified in the organization’s security policy, are documented in job
descriptions.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that personnel and
hiring practices enhance and support the
trustworthiness of the CA ’s operations.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

3.4 Personnel Security

4

Inventories of important CA assets are maintained.

2

Owners are identified for all major CA assets and assigned responsibility for the maintenance of
appropriate controls.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA assets and
information receive an appropriate level of protection.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

3.3 Asset Classification and Management

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity o f key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

3

2
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The perimeter of the building or site containing the CA facility is physically sound (meaning, there should
be no gaps in the perimeter where a break-in could easily occur).
A manned reception area or other means to control physical access is in place to restrict access to the
building or site housing CA operations to authorized personnel only.

Physical protection is achieved through the creation of clearly defined security perimeters (meaning,
physical barriers) around the business premises and CA facilities.

1

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that physical access to
CA facilities is limited to properly authorized
individuals and CA facilities are protected from
environmental hazards.

Contracting personnel controls include the following:
a.
Bonding requirements on contract personnel
b.
Contractual requirements including indemnification for damages due to the actions of the
contractor personnel
c.
Audit and monitoring of contractor personnel
All employees of the organization and, where relevant, third-party users, receive appropriate training in
organizational policies and procedures. The CA ’s policies and procedures specify the following:
a. The training requirements and training procedures for each role
b.
Any retraining period and retraining procedures for each role
Periodic reviews occur to verify the continued trustworthiness of personnel involved in the activities related
to related to key management and certificate management.
A formal disciplinary process exists and is followed for employees who have violated organizational
security policies and procedures. The CA ’s policies and procedures specify the sanctions against personnel
for unauthorized actions, unauthorized use of authority, and unauthorized use of systems.
Appropriate and timely actions are taken when an employee is terminated so that controls and security are
not impaired by such an occurrence.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

8

7

6

5

4

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

3.5 Physical and Environmental Security

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
• subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity o f key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that loss, damage, or
compromise of assets and interruption to business
activities are prevented.

CRITERIA

Power and telecommunications cabling carrying data or supporting CA services is protected from
interception or damage.

18

Page 69

Version 1.0

Equipment is protected from power failures and other electrical anomalies.

17
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Equipment is sited or protected such as to reduce the risks from environmental threats and hazards, and
opportunities for unauthorized access.

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

Third party support services personnel are granted restricted access to secure CA facilities only when
required and such access is authorized and monitored.
Access rights to the CA facility are regularly reviewed and updated.

Unsupervised working in secure CA facilities is not allowed both for safety reasons and to prevent
opportunities for malicious activities.
All personnel are required to wear visible identification and are encouraged to challenge anyone not
wearing visible identification.
Access to CA facilities is controlled and restricted to authorized persons only through the use of
authentication controls as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 43).
All personnel entering and leaving the CA facility are logged (meaning, an audit trail of all access is
securely maintained).
Visitors to the CA facility are supervised and their date and time of entry and departure recorded.

9

•

The CA facility is physically locked and periodically checked when vacant.

8

7

Intruder detection systems are installed and regularly tested to cover all external doors of the building
housing the CA facility and the CA facility itself.
The CA facility is alarmed when unoccupied.

To prevent unauthorized entry and environmental contamination, proper physical barriers are in place (for
example, extended from real floor to real ceiling as opposed to raised floor to suspended ceiling) as
disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 43).
All fire doors on security perimeters around the CA facilities are alarmed and slam shut.

6

5

4

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
• subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

Personal computers and workstations are not left logged on when unattended and are protected by key
locks, passwords, or other controls when not in use.
Equipment, information, and software belonging to the organization cannot be taken off-site without
authorization.

22

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

5

4

3

2
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Prior to using external facilities management services, risks are identified, and appropriate controls are
agreed upon with the contractor and incorporated into the contract.

Formal management responsibilities and procedures exist to control all changes to CA equipment, software,
and operating procedures.
Duties and areas of responsibility are segregated in order to reduce opportunities for unauthorized
modification or misuse of information or sendees.
Development and testing facilities are separated from operational facilities.

CA operating procedures are documented and maintained.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the correct and
secure operation of CA information processing
facilities is ensured.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

23

21

20

Equipment is maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and/or other documented
procedures to ensure its continued availability and integrity.
All items of equipment containing storage media (meaning, fixed hard disks) are checked to determine
whether they contain any sensitive data prior to disposal or reuse. Storage devices containing sensitive
information are physically destroyed or securely overwritten prior to disposal or reuse.
Sensitive or critical business information is locked away when not required and when the CA facility is
vacated.

19

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

3.6 Operations Management

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that compromise or
theft of information and information processing
facilities are prevented.

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
• subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

Incident management responsibilities and procedures exist and are followed to ensure a quick, effective,
and orderly response to security incidents.

14

Page 71

Version 1.0

The types, volumes, and costs of incidents and malfunctions are quantified and monitored.

13
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Procedures exist and are followed to ensure that faults are reported and corrective action is taken.

12

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Users of CA systems are required to note and report observed or suspected security weaknesses in or
threats to systems or services.
Procedures exist and are followed for reporting software malfunctions.

10
11

A formal reporting procedure exists and is followed, together with an incident response procedure, setting
out the action to be taken on receipt of an incident report.

9

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that damage from
security incidents and malfunctions is minimized
through the use of incident reporting and response
procedures.

Acceptance criteria for new information systems, upgrades and new versions are established and suitable
tests of the system carried out prior to acceptance.
Detection and prevention controls to protect against viruses and malicious software and appropriate user
awareness procedures are implemented.

7
8

Capacity demands are monitored and projections of future capacity requirements made to ensure that
adequate processing power and storage are available.

6

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
___________ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of CA
systems and information is protected against viruses
and malicious software.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the risk of CA
systems failure is minimized.

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
• subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
• the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
• CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

c.
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17 Procedures for the handling and storage of information exist and are followed in order to protect such
_____ information from unauthorized disclosure or misuse.______________________________________________
18 System documentation is protected from unauthorized access.

16

Authorization is required for all media removed from the organization and a record of all such
removals to maintain an audit trail is kept.

All media are stored in a safe, secure environment, in accordance with manufacturers’
specifications.
Media is disposed of securely and safely when no longer required.

b.

Procedures for the management of removable computer media require the following.
a. If no longer required, the previous contents of any re-usable media that are to be removed
from the organization are erased.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that media are securely
handled to protect media from damage, theft, and
unauthorized access.
15

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
_______ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)___________

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Users are required to follow defined policies and procedures in th e selection and use of passwords.

Users are required to ensure that unattended equipment has appropriate protection.

6
7

If permitted, access by remote users is subject to authentication.
Connections to remote computer systems are authenticated.

10
11
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The path from the user terminal to computer services is controlled.

9
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Users are provided direct access only to the services that they have been specifically authorized to use.

8

Network access control

Users’ access rights are reviewed at regular intervals.

5

3

The allocation of passwords is controlled through a formal management process.

Number of persons required to perform specific CA operations (meaning, m of n rule)

d.

4

Segregation of duties

c.

A formal user registration and deregistration procedure for granting access to CA information systems and
services is followed.
The allocation and use of privileges is restricted and controlled.

Identification and authentication process for each user

b.

2

Roles and corresponding access permissions

a.

Business requirements for access control are defined and documented in an access control policy which
includes at least the following:

User access management

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA system access
is limited to properly authorized individuals.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

3.7 System Access Management

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

CRITERIA

If required based on a risk assessment, duress alarms are provided for users who might be the target of

22

26

25

24

23

21

20
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Access to information and application system functions are restricted in accordance with the access control
policy.
Sensitive systems require a dedicated (isolated) computing environment.

Application access control

coercion.
Inactive terminals serving CA systems timeout after a defined period of inactivity to prevent access by
unauthorized persons.______
Restrictions on connection times are used to provide additional security for high-risk applications.

All users have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal and sole use so that activities can be traced to
the responsible individual.__________________________________________________________
A password management system is in place to provide an effective, interactive facility which ensures
quality passwords.___________________________________________________________
Use of system utility programs are restricted and tightly controlled.

19

18

Automatic terminal identification is used to authenticate connections to specific locations and to portable
equipment.___________________________________________________________________________
Access to CA systems uses a secure logon process.

17

16

15

Operating system access control

Controls (for example, firewalls) are in place to protect the CA ’s internal network domains from external
network domains accessible by third parties.
Controls are in place to limit the services (for example, HTTP, FTP) available to users in accordance with
the CA ’s access control policies.________________________________________________________
Routing controls are in place to ensure that computer connections and information flows do not breach th e
access control policy of the organization’s business applications.
The security attributes of all network services used by the organization are documented by the CA.

13
14

Access to diagnostic ports is securely controlled.

12

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
• subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
• the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
• CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Strict control is maintained over access to program source libraries.

The implementation of changes is strictly controlled by the use of formal change control procedures to
minimize the risk of corruption of information systems.
Application systems are reviewed and tested when operating system changes occur.
Modifications to software packages are discouraged and essential changes strictly controlled.
The purchase, use, and modification of software is controlled and checked to protect against possible covert
channels and Trojan code.______________________________________________________________
Controls are in place to secure outsourced software development.

5

6
7

9
10
11

8
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Test data is protected and controlled.

4
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Change control procedures exist and are followed for emergency software fixes.

3

2

Change control procedures exist and are followed for the implementation of software on operational
systems.
Change control procedures exist and are followed for scheduled software releases and modifications.

Business requirements for new systems or enhancements to existing systems specify the requirements for
controls.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA systems
development and maintenance activities are properly
authorized to maintain CA system integrity.
1

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)

3.8 Systems Development and Maintenance

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

Business continuity plans are maintained by regular reviews and updates to ensure their continuing
effectiveness.
Business continuity plans define an acceptable system outage time, recovery time, and the average time
between failures as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 44).
The CA ’s business continuity plans include disaster recovery processes for all critical components of a CA
system, including the hardware, software, and keys, in the event of a failure of one or more of these
components.
The CA’s business continuity plans address the recovery procedures used if computing resources, software,
and/or data are corrupted or suspected to be corrupted.

6

9

8

7

5
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The CA has business continuity plans to maintain or restore the CA ’s business operations in a timely
manner following interruption to, or failure of, critical business processes as disclosed in the CA ’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 44).____________________________________ ___________
The CA has a business continuity planning framework which requires that business continuity plans
address the following:
a.
The conditions for activating th e plans
b.
Emergency procedures
c.
Fallback procedures
d. Resumption procedures
e.
A maintenance schedule
f. Awareness and education requirements
g. The responsibilities of the individuals
Business continuity plans are tested regularly to ensure that they are up-to-date and effective.

3

/

The CA has a business continuity planning strategy based on an appropriate risk assessment.

2

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The CA has a managed process for developing and maintaining its business continuity plans.

1

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance of continuity of
operations in the event of a disaster.

4

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

—

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

3.9 Business Continuity Management

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that potential

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance of continuity of
operations in the event of the compromise of the CA’s
private signing key.

CRITERIA

18

17

16

15
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In the event of the compromise or suspected compromise of a CA ’s private key, disaster recovery
procedures include the revocation and reissuance of all certificates that were signed with the CA ’s private
key.____________________________________________________________________________
The recovery procedures used if the CA ’s private key is compromised and the CA ’s public key is revoked
include the following:
a.
How a secure environment is reestablished
b.
How the CA ’s new public key is provided to the users
c.
How the subjects are recertified
In the event that the CA has to replace its CA Root private key, procedures are in place for the secure and
authenticated revocation of the following:
a. The set of all certificates issued by a CA based on the compromised private key
b. Any subordinate CA private keys and corresponding certificates
The CA ’s business continuity plan for key compromise addresses who is notified and what actions are
taken with system software and hardware, symmetric and asymmetric keys, previously generated
signatures, and encrypted data.
_______________________________
The CA maintains procedures for the termination, notification of affected entities, and for transferring
relevant archived CA records to a custodian as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item

14

13

12

11

The CA ’s business continuity plans include procedures for securing its facility during the period of time
following a natural or other disaster and before a secure environment is reestablished either at the original
site or a remote hot site.
Back-up copies of essential business information and software are regularly taken as disclosed in the CA ’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 44). The security requirements of these copies are consistent with the
controls for the information backed up._________________________________________________
Fallback equipment and back-up media are sited at a safe distance to avoid damage from disaster at the
main site as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 44).________________
The CA ’s business continuity plans address the compromise or suspected compromise of a CA ’s private
signing key as a disaster.

10

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

7

6

5

Information that can be revealed as part of civil discovery
e.

g.
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The conditions upon which CA or RA may disclose information upon the owner’s request;
and

The policy on release of information to law enforcement officials

d.

.

Who is entitled to be informed of reasons for revocation and suspension of certificates

c.

f

The kinds of information that are not considered confidential

b.

Management authorizes the use of information processing facilities and controls are applied to prevent the
misuse of such facilities.
Controls are in place to ensure compliance with national agreements, laws, regulations, or other instruments
to control the access to or use of cryptographic controls.
As disclosed in the CA ’s business practices (Principle 1, item 41), the CA ’s confidentiality policies and
procedures address the following:
a. The kinds of information that must be kept confidential by CA or RA

Controls are applied to protect personal information in accordance with relevant legislation.

4

2

3

All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements are explicitly defined and documented for
each information system.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the CA complies
with legal requirements.

Appropriate procedures are implemented to ensure compliance with legal restrictions on the use of material
in respect of intellectual property rights, and on the use of proprietary software products as disclosed in the
CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 42).
Important records of an organization are protected from loss, destruction, and falsification.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

3.10 Monitoring and Compliance
1

40).

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

disruptions to subscribers and relying parties are
minimized as a result of the cessation of the CA ’s
services._____________________________________

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
• subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

The CA ’s operations are subject to regular review to ensure compliance with security policies and
standards.____________________________________________ ___________________________
CA systems are periodically checked for compliance with security implementation standards.

9

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

All journal entries include the following elements:
a.
Date and time of the entry

2
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Serial or sequence number of entry (for automatic journal entries)

The CA generates automatic (electronic) and manual event journals as appropriate.

1

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that significant CA
environmental, key management, and certificate
management events are accurately and completely
logged.

b.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

Version 1.0

Procedures for monitoring the use of CA systems are established and the result of the monitoring activities
reviewed regularly.

Access to system audit tools is protected to prevent possible misuse or compromise.

12
13

Audits of operational systems are planned and agreed such as to minimize th e risk of disruptions to
business processes.

11

10

Managers are responsible for ensuring that security procedures within their area of responsibility are
carried out correctly.

8

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)

3.11 Event Journaling

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that unauthorized CA
system usage is detected.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the effectiveness of
the system audit process is maximized and
interference to and from the system audit process is
minimized.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that compliance with
the CA’s security policies and procedures is ensured.

CRITERIA

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

CRITERIA

Source of entry (for example., terminal, port, location, customer)

d.

Withdrawal of keying material from service

i.

material:

Backup
Storage

c.

d.
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Installation of manual cryptographic keys and its outcome (with the identity of the operator)
b.
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Generation
a.

of devices or media holding keys
Events to be journalized in the event journal (s) include the following information concerning keying

m. Custody of keys and

portable devices or media)

j. CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key destruction
k. Identity of th e entity authorizing a key management operation
l. Identity of the entity handling any keying material (such as key components or keys stored in

CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key archival

h.

g. CA key usage

b. Installation

of manual cryptographic keys and its outcome (with the identity of the operator)
c. CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key backup
d. CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key storage
e. CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key recovery
f. CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key escrow activities (optional)

e.

Identity of the entity making the journal entry
The CA logs the following key life cycle management related events:
a. CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key generation

Kind of entry

c.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9 . 79 standard)

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

CRITERIA

5

W ithdraw al o f keying m aterial fro m service
Destruction

Generation

Receipt o f requests for certificate(s)

C ertificate revocation and hold requests

i.

j.
k.

l.
m.

Submissions

D istribution o f the C A ’ s public key

e.

Generation and issuance o f C ertificate Revocation Lists
h.
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C ertificate suspension requests

( if applicable)

C ertificate revocation and suspension requests

g.

f

.

G eneration

d.

o f certificates

Change

c.

o f a ffilia tio n o f an entity

keys for certification

o f public

b.

Submissions

R eceipt o f requests fo r certificate(s)

a.

r.
E xpiration o f a certificate
The C A logs the fo llo w in g certificate life cycle m anagem ent related events:

p.

o. D istribution

o f the C A ’ s public-key
o f public-keys for certification
q. Com prom ise o f a private key

n. Receipt, generation and sending

o f C ertificate Revocation Lists

A rchival

h.

o f certificates

C A key usage

Escrow activities

g.

fi

e. Recovery

Version 1.0

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
___________ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)___________

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The Certification Authority maintains controls to

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the confidentiality
and integrity of current and archived event journals
are maintained.

CRITERIA

Device usage
Device deinstallation

Designation of a device for service and repair

c.

d.
e.

Storage location of copies of applications and identification documents

Identity of entity accepting the application

Method used to validate identification documents, if any

c.

d.
e.

The private key used for signing event journals is not used for any other purpose.

12

Page 82

© 2000 AICPA / CICA

Version 1.0

The CA archives event journal data on a periodic basis as disclosed in the CA ’s business practices

Current and archived automated event journals are protected from modification or substitution.

11

13

Current and archived event journals are maintained in a form that prevents unauthorized modification or
destruction.

9
10

CA computer system clocks are synchronized for accurate recording.

8

f.

Record of unique identification data, numbers, or a combination thereof (for example,
applicant’s drivers license number) of identification documents, if applicable

b.

f.
Device retirement
The CA logs (or requires that the RA log) the following certificate application information:
a. Kind of identification documents) presented by the applicant

Entering or removing a device from storage

b.

The CA logs the following cryptographic device life cycle management related events:
a.
Device receipt

Name of receiving CA or submitting RA, if applicable
Event journals do not record the plain text values of any private keys.

7

6

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
___________ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)______

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity o f key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

The C ertification A uthority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that event journals are
review ed periodically by authorized personnel.

provide reasonable assurance that event journals are
com pletely and confidentially archived in accordance
w ith disclosed business practices.

CRITERIA

18

17

16

15

14__
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The review o f current and archived event journals includes a validation
the identification and fo llo w -u p o f exceptional, unauthorized, or suspicious

Version 1.0

o f the event journals ’ integrity, and

a c tiv ity .

Event journals are review ed periodically as disclosed in the C A ’ s business practices (Principle 1, item 4 5 ).

Current and archived event journals m ay only be retrieved b y authorized individuals fo r valid business or
security reasons.

A risk

assessment has been perform ed to determ ine the appropriate length o f tim e fo r retention o f archived
event journals.
________________________________________________________________________________________
The C A maintains archived event journals at a secure off-site location fo r a predeterm ined period.

(Principle 1, item 45).

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
_______________ (based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9. 79 standard)___________

PRINCIPLE 3: CA Environmental Controls - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
•
subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the
CA ’s business;
•
the continuity o f key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
•
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

Appendix A - Illustrative Examples of Practitioner Reports

This appendix presents six illustrative reports for WebTrust for Certification Authorities
engagements.

Illustrations 1-3 are prepared in accordance with the American Institute of

Certified Public Accounts’ (AICPA’s) attestation standards. Illustrations 4 and 6 are prepared in

accordance with the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants’ (CICA’s) assurance standards.
Both attest and direct engagements and reporting are supported in Canada. The practitioner’s

communication will vary depending on whether the assurance engagement is an attest
engagement or a direct reporting engagement.

In an attest engagement, the practitioner’s

conclusion will be on a written assertion prepared by the accountable party. The assertion
evaluates, using suitable criteria, the subject matter for which the accountable party is

responsible.

In a direct reporting engagement, the practitioner’s conclusion will evaluate

directly, using suitable criteria, the subject matter for which the accountable party is responsible.

Under the U. S. Attestation Standards, the first paragraph of the practitioner’s report will state
that the practitioner has performed an examination of management’s assertion about disclosures

of its business practices and effectiveness of its controls in conformity with the WebTrust

Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities.

The practitioner may opine (1) on

management’s assertion or (2) directly on the subject matter. Samples of both kinds of reports

have been provided.

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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Illustration No. 1 for Use in the United States
(Example where all criteria are applicable)
Report of Independent Certified Public Accountant
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Inc.:

We have examined the assertion by the management of ABC Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA)
that in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services at LOCATION, ABC-CA, during the period
from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yyy, 2000—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices (hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided
such services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of
keys and certificates it managed was established and protected throughout their life
cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:

- subscriber and relying party information was properly authenticated, restricted to
authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business;
- the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in conformity with the A1CPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria]. ABC-CA’s management is responsible for its
assertion [hot link to management’s assertion]. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management’s assertion based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and accordingly, included (1) obtaining an understanding of
ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices and its
controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying
party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations, and over
development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2) selectively testing transactions
executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and
(4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that
our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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because of the passage of time, such as to accommodate dates in the year 2000, or (4) degree of
compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the validity of such conclusions.
In our opinion, for the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000, ABC-CA management’s assertion,
as set forth in the first paragraph, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the AICPA/CICA
Web Trustfor Certification Authorities Criteria.

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have
performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying
party locations.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA’s services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA’s
services for any customer’s intended purpose

[Name of CPA firm]
Certified Public Accountants
[City, State]
[Date]

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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Illustration No. 2 for Use in the United States
(Example where external RAs are used, the CA does not support key escrow,
certificate renewal, certificate suspension, the use of smart cards, or the
provision of subscriber key management services)

Report of Independent Certified Public Accountant
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Inc.:
We have examined the assertion by the management of ABC Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA)
that in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services at LOCATION, ABC-CA during the period
from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000—]:
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided
such services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of
keys and certificates it managed was established and protected throughout their life
cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:

- subscriber and relying party information was properly authenticated, restricted to
authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business;
- the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in conformity with AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust
for Certification Authorities Criteria]. ABC-CA’s management is responsible for its assertion [hot link
to management’s assertion]. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion
based on our examination.
ABC-CA makes use of external registration authorities for specific subscriber registration activities as
disclosed in ABC-CA’s business practice disclosures. Our examination did not extend to the controls of
external registration authorities.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and accordingly, included (1) obtaining an understanding of
ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices and its
controls over key and certificate integrity, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle
management operations, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying party information
and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2) selectively testing
transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle management business
and information privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls;

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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and (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe
that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, such as to accommodate dates in the year 2000, or (4) degree of
compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the validity of such conclusions.
In our opinion, for the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000, ABC-CA management’s assertion,
as set forth in the first paragraph, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the AICPA/CICA
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities Criteria.
The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at external registration authorities and individual subscriber and
relying party locations. We have performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at
external registration authorities and individual subscriber and relying party locations.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA’s services beyond those

covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA’s

services for any customer’s intended purpose

[Name of CPA firm]
Certified Public Accountants
[City, State]
[Date]
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Illustration No. 3 for Use in the United States
(Example where all criteria are applicable)

Report of Independent Certified Public Accountant
- Direct Report
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Inc.:

We have examined the assertion [hot link to management’s assertion] by the management of ABC
Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA) regarding the disclosure of its key and certificate life cycle
management business and information privacy practices oh its Web site and the effectiveness of its
controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying
party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations and over
development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity, based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria], during
the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000.

These disclosures and controls are the responsibility of ABC-CA’s management.
responsibility is to express an opinion based on our examination.

Our

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and accordingly, included (1) obtaining an understanding of
ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices and its
controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying
party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations and over
development, maintenance, and operation of systems integrity; (2) selectively testing transactions
executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and
(4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that
our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, such as to accommodate dates in the year 2000, or (4) degree of
compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the validity of such conclusions.
In our opinion, during the period from Xxxx, xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000, ABC-CA in all material
respects—

•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
certificates it managed was established and protected throughout their life cycles
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•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that subscriber and relying party
information was properly authenticated, restricted to authorized individuals, and protected from
uses not related to the CA’s business; the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management
operations was maintained; and CA systems development, maintenance and operations were
. properly authorised and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities Criteria].

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have performed
no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying party
locations.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA’s services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA’s
services for any customer’s intended purpose

[Name of CPA firm]
Certified Public Accountants
[City, State]
[Date]
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Illustration No. 4 for Use in Canada
Attest Report Based on CICA Standards
Unqualified Opinion
Auditor’s Report
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Ltd.:
We have audited the assertion by the management of ABC Certification Authority, Ltd. (ABC-CA) that
during the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at
LOCATION, ABC-CA—

•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided
such services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of
keys and certificates it managed was established and protected throughout their life
cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- subscriber and relying party information was properly authenticated, restricted to
authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business;

- the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria]. ABC-CA’s management is responsible for its
assertion [hot link to management’s assertion]. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management’s assertion based on our audit.

We conducted our audit in accordance with standards for assurance engagements established by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform our audit
to obtain reasonable assurance that management’s assertion is not materially misstated. Our audit
included (1) obtaining an understanding of ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management
business and information privacy practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the
authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and
certificate life cycle management operations and over development, maintenance and operation of
systems integrity; (2) selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and
certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating
the operating effectiveness of the controls; and (4) performing such other procedures as we considered
necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, ABC-CA’s management’s assertion for the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy,
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2000, is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with the CICA/AICPA WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria.

Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, such as to accommodate dates in the year 2000, or (4) degree of
compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have
performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying
party locations.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA’s services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA’s
services for any customer’s intended purpose

[City, Province]
[Date of report]

[Name of CA firm]
Chartered Accountants
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Illustration No. 5 for Use in Canada
Example where external RAs are used, the CA does not support key escrow,
certificate renewal, certificate suspension, the use of smart cards, or the
provision of subscriber key management services)
Attest Report Based on CICA Standards
Unqualified Opinion
Auditor’s Report
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Ltd.:

We have audited the assertion by the management of ABC Certification Authority, Ltd. (ABC-CA) that
during the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at
LOCATION, ABC-CA—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided
such services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of
keys and certificates it managed was established and protected throughout their life
cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- subscriber and relying party information was properly authenticated, restricted to
authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business;
- the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and

- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity
in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria]. ABC-CA’s management is responsible for its
assertion [hot link to management’s assertion]. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management’s assertion based on our audit.
ABC-CA makes use of external registration authorities for specific subscriber registration activities as
disclosed in ABC-CA’s business practice disclosures. Our audit did not extend to the controls of
external registration authorities.

We conducted our audit in accordance with standards for assurance engagements established by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform our audit
to obtain reasonable assurance that management’s assertion is not materially misstated. Our audit
included (1) obtaining an understanding of ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management
business and information privacy practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the
privacy of subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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management operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2)
selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle
management business and information privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating
effectiveness of the controls; and (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the
circumstances. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, ABC-CA’s management’s assertion for the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy,
2000, is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with the CICA/AICPA WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria.

Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, such as to accommodate dates in the year 2000, or (4) degree of
compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have
performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying
party locations.

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA’s services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA’s

services for any customer’s intended purpose

[City, Province]
[Date of report]

[Name of CA firm]
Chartered Accountants
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Illustration No. 6 for Use In Canada
Direct Report Based on CICA Standards
Unqualified Opinion

Auditor’s Report
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Ltd.:
We have audited, for its LOCATION, ABC Certification Authority, Ltd.’s (ABC-CA) disclosure of its
key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices) and the
effectiveness of its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of
subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle
management operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity during
the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000 . These disclosures and controls are the responsibility
of the ABC-CA’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the conformity of these
disclosures and controls with the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust
for Certification Authorities Criteria], based on our audit

We conducted our audit in accordance with standards for assurance engagements established by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform our audit
to obtain reasonable assurance as a basis for our opinion. Our audit included (1) obtaining an
understanding of ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy

practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of
subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle
management operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2)

selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle
management business and information privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating

effectiveness of the controls; and (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the
circumstances. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, during the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000, ABC-CA in all material
respects—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided
such services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of
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keys and certificates it managed was established and protected throughout their life
cycles
•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- subscriber and relying party information was properly authenticated, restricted to
authorized individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business;
- the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities Criteria].
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, such as to accommodate dates in the year 2000, or (4) degree of
compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal of assurance on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended nor should it be construed to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have
performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying
party locations.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA’s services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA’s

services for any customer’s intended purpose

[Name of CA firm]
Chartered Accountants

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Province]
[Date ofreport]
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Appendix B - Illustrative Examples of Management’s Assertion

Illustration No. 1 for Use in the United States and Canada
(Example where all criteria are applicable)

Assertion of Management as to
its Disclosure of its Business Practices and its Controls Over
its Certification Authority Operations
during the period from January 1,2000 through June 30, 2000
[Date]

ABC Certification Authority, Inc. operates as a Certification Authority (CA) known as ABC-CA. ABCCA, as a Root CA [or as a subordinate CA ofDEF Certification Authority, Inc.], provides the following
certification authority services:
•

Subscriber key management services

•

Subscriber registration

•

Certificate renewal

•

Certificate rekey

•

Certificate issuance

•

Certificate distribution [using an online repository]

•

Certificate revocation

•

Certificate suspension

•

Certificate revocation list processing [using an online repository]

•

Smart card life cycle management

Management of ABC-CA is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its CA
operations, including CA business practices disclosure [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure],
service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls), and CA environmental
controls. These controls contain monitoring mechanisms, and actions are taken to correct deficiencies
identified.

There are inherent limitations in any controls, including the possibility of human error and the
circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective controls can provide only
reasonable assurance with respect to ABC-CA’s Certification Authority operations. Furthermore
because of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.
Management has assessed the controls over its CA operations.
Management’s opinion, ABC-CA has—
•

Based on that assessment, in

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices and provided its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
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•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that.

Subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized
individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business.

-

The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations is maintained.
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed
to maintain CA systems integrity.

for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at LOCATION during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000,
through Yyyy yy, 2000, in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities
Criteria [hot link to WebTrustfor Certification Authorities Criteria] including the following:

CA Business Practices Disclosure
Service Integrity
Kev Life Cycle Management Controls

CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup, and Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Escrow
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management
CA-Provided Subscriber Key Management Services
Certificate Life Cycle Management Controls
Subscriber Registration
Certificate Renewal
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Suspension
Certificate Revocation List Processing
Smart Card Life Cycle Management

CA Environmental Controls
Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
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Systems Development and Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling

[Name]
[Title]
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Illustration No. 2 for Use in the United States and Canada

(Example where external RAs are used, the CA does not support key escrow,
certificate suspension, the use of smart cards, or the provision of subscriber key
management services)
Assertion of Management as to
its Disclosure of its Business Practices and its Controls Over
its Certification Authority Operations
during the period from January 1, 2000 through June 30, 2000
[Date]

ABC Certification Authority, Inc. operates as a Certification Authority (CA) known as ABC-CA.
ABC-CA, as a Root CA [or as a subordinate CA of DEF Certification Authority, Inc.], provides

the following certification authority services:
•

Certificate rekey

•

Certificate issuance

•

Certificate distribution (using an online repository)

•

Certificate revocation

•

Certificate revocation list processing (using an online repository)

ABC-CA makes use of external registration authorities for specific subscriber registration activities as
disclosed in ABC-CA’s business practice disclosures.
Management of ABC-CA is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its
Certification Authority operations, including CA business practices disclosure [hot link to CA Business
Practices Disclosure], service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls),
and CA environmental controls. These controls contain monitoring mechanisms, and actions are taken
to correct deficiencies identified.

There are inherent limitations in any controls including the possibility of human error and the
circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective internal control can provide only
reasonable assurance with respect to ABC-CA’s Certification Authority operations. Furthermore
because of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.
Management has assessed the controls over its CA operations.
Management’s opinion, ABC-CA has—

Based on that assessment, in

•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices and provided its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
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certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that its Certification Authority (CA)
operations at LOCATION during the period from January 1, 2000, through June 30, 2000, in conformity
with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria] includes the following
Subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized
individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business.
The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations is maintained.

CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed
to maintain CA systems integrity.

CA Business Practices Disclosure
Service Integrity

Kev Life Cycle Management Controls
CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management

Certificate Life Cycle Management Controls
Subscriber Registration
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Revocation List Processing

CA Environmental Controls
Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling
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[Name]

[Title]
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Appendix C - Illustrative Examples of Management’s Representation

ILLUSTRATION NO. 1 FOR USE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(Example where all criteria are applicable)
[Date]
X, Y & Z [Name of CPA or Chartered Accountantfirm]
[Address]

Dear Members of the Firm:
Management confirms its understanding that your examination of our assertion related to ABC
Certification Authority, Inc.’s (ABC-CA) business practices disclosure and controls over its Certification
Authority operations during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000, through Yyyy yy, 2000, was made for the
purpose of expressing an opinion as to whether our assertion is fairly presented, in all material respects,
and that your opinion is based on criteria for effective controls as stated in our assertion document. We
are responsible for our assertion. In connection with your examination, management—

a.

Acknowledges its responsibility for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its
Certification Authority (CA) operations at LOCATION, including CA business practices
disclosure, service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls), and
CA environmental controls.

b.

Has performed an assessment and believes that ABC-CA’s CA business practices disclosure,
service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls), and CA
environmental controls met the minimum requirement of the criteria described in our assertion
document during the period from January 1, 2000, through June 30,2000.

c.

Believes the stated criteria against which our assertion has been assessed are reasonable and
appropriate.

d.

Has disclosed to you that there are no significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the
controls which could adversely affect the Company’s ability to comply with the control criteria
related to ABC-CA’s CA business practices disclosure, service integrity (including key and
certificate life cycle management controls), and CA environmental controls, consistent with the
assertions of management.

e.

Has made available to you all significant information and records related to our assertion.

f.

Has responded fully to all inquiries made to us by you during your examination.

g.

Has disclosed to you any changes occurring or planned to occur subsequent to June 30,2000, in
controls or other factors that might significantly affect the controls, including any corrective
actions taken by management with regard to significant deficiencies.

In management’s opinion, ABC-CA has—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
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Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
Subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized
individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business;

The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations is maintained;
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed
to maintain CA systems integrity.

for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at LOCATION during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000
through Yyyy yy, 2000, in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities
Criteria including the following:

CA Business Practices Disclosure

Service Integrity

Kev Life Cycle Management Controls
CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Escrow
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management
CA-Provided Subscriber Key Management Services

Certificate Life Cycle Management Controls

Subscriber Registration
Certificate Renewal
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Suspension
Certificate Revocation List Processing
Smart Card Life Cycle Management
CA Environmental Controls

Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Security
WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling
Very truly yours,

[Name]

[Title]
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ILLUSTRATION NO. 2 FOR USE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(Example where external RAs are used, the CA does not support key escrow,
certificate renewal, certificate suspension, the use of smart cards, or the
provision of subscriber key management services)
[Date]

X, Y & Z [Name of CPA or Chartered Accountant firm]
Address
Dear Members of the Firm: Management confirms its understanding that your examination of our
assertion related to ABC Certification Authority, Inc.’s (ABC-CA) business practices disclosure and
controls over its Certification Authority operations during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000, through Yyyy
yy, 2000, was made for the purpose of expressing an opinion as to whether our assertion is fairly
presented, in all material respects, and that your opinion is based on criteria for effective controls as
stated in our assertion document. ABC-CA makes use of external registration authorities for specific
subscriber registration activities, as disclosed in ABC-CA’s business practice disclosures. We are
responsible for our assertion. In connection with your examination, management—

a.

Acknowledges its responsibility for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its CA
operations, including CA business practices disclosure, service integrity (including key and
certificate life cycle management controls), and CA environmental controls.

b.

Has performed an assessment and believes that ABC-CA’s CA business practices disclosure,
service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls), and CA
environmental controls, met the minimum requirement of the criteria described in our assertion
document during the period from January 1,2000 through June 30,2000.

c.

Believes the stated criteria against which our assertion has been assessed are reasonable and
appropriate.

d.

Has disclosed to you that there are no significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the
controls which could adversely affect the Company’s ability to comply with the control criteria
related to ABC-CA’s CA business practices disclosure, service integrity (including key and
certificate life cycle management controls), and CA environmental controls, consistent with the
assertions of management.

e.

Has made available to you all significant information and records related to our assertion.

f.

Has responded fully to all inquiries made to us by you during your examination.

g.

Has disclosed to you any changes occurring or planned to occur subsequent to June 30,2000, in
controls or other factors that might significantly affect the controls, including any corrective
actions taken by management with regard to significant deficiencies.

In management’s opinion, ABC-CA has—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
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•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of keys and
certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:

Subscriber and relying party information is properly authenticated, restricted to authorized
individuals, and protected from uses not related to the CA’s business.

The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations is maintained.
CA systems development, maintenance and operation are properly authorized and performed
to maintain CA systems integrity.
for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at LOCATION during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000
through Yyyy yy, 2000, in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities
Criteria including:

CA Business Practices Disclosure

Service Integrity
Kev Life Cycle Management Controls

CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management
Certificate Life Cycle Management Controls

Subscriber Registration
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Revocation List Processing

CA Environmental Controls
Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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Very truly yours,

[Name]
[Title]

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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Appendix D - WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria and ANSI X9.79 (draft)
Cross-Reference

Mapping of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria
to the ANSI X9.79 (draft) PKI Practices and Policy Framework standard’s
Certification Authority Control Objectives (CACO)

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities Criteria

X9.79

§1

CA Business Practices
Disclosure

§7, §A, &§B

General Requirements - CP
and Certification Practice
Statements; PKI Practices and
Policy Elements; and
Certification Authority Control
Objectives

§2

Service Integrity

§B.2 & B.3

Key and Certificate Life Cycle
Management Controls

§2.1

Key Life Cycle Management
Controls

§B.2

Key Life Cycle Management
Controls

§2.1.1
§2.1.2

CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and
Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Escrow
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life
Cycle Management
CA-Provided Subscriber Key
Management Services

§B.2.1
§B.2.2

CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and
Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Escrow
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life
Cycle Management
CA-Provided Subscriber Key
Management Services

§2.2

Certificate Life Cycle
Management Controls

§B.3

Certificate Life Cycle
Management Controls

§2.2.1
§2.2.2
§2.2.3
§2.2.4
§2.2.5
§2.2.6
§2.2.7
§2.2.8

Subscriber Registration
Certificate Renewal
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Suspension
Certificate Revocation List

§B.3.1
§B.3.2
§B.3.3
§B.3.4
§B.3.5
§B.3.6
§B.3.7
§B.3.8

Subscriber Registration
Certificate Renewal
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Suspension
Certificate Revocation List

§2.1.3
§2.1.4
§2.1.5
§2.1.6
§2.1.7
§2.1.8
§2.1.9

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

§B.2.3
§B.2.4
§B.2.5
§B.2.6
§B.2.7
§B.2.8

§B.2.9
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X9.79

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities Criteria
§2.2.9

Processing
Smart Card Life Cycle
Management

§B.3.9

Processing
Smart Card Life Cycle
Management

§3

CA Environmental Controls

§B.1

CA Environmental Controls

§3.1

Certification Practice Statement
and Certificate Policy
Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and
Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental
Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and
Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling

§B.1.1

Certification Practice Statement
and Certificate Policy
Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and
Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental
Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and
Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling

§3.2
§3.3
§3.4
§3.5

§3.6
§3.7
§3.8

§3.9
§3.10
§3.11

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

§B.1.2
§B.1.3
§B.1.4
§B.1.5
§B.1.6
§B.1.7
§B.1.8

§B.1.9
§B.1.10
§B.1.11
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N o m andatory coverage
Coverage m ust be form ulated fo r each
engagement and defined in report scope.

N o m andatory coverage

Coverage m ust be form ulated fo r each
engagement and defined in report scope.
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G enerally accepted auditing standards

R eport on controls placed in operation
Report on controls placed in operation
and tests o f operating effectiveness

activity coverage
D efined by each engagement

and processing environments
Practical usage now results in business

A uditor to auditor com m unication for
obtaining reliance for audit purposes
Covers specified applications, functions

A IC P A SA S N o . 70

Report on design and existence o f
control procedures
Report on design, effective operation,
and continuity o f control procedures
Generally accepted auditing standards

Covers specified applications, functions,
and processing environments
Practical usage now results in business
activity coverage
D efined by each engagement

A uditor to auditor com m unication for
obtaining reliance for audit purposes

C IC A Section 5900

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities

Examination
Standards
Coverage of
Activities

Type of Engagement

T a rg e t o f E v a lu a tio n

Purpose

C o n ten t/A p p ro ach

WebTrust

for Certification

Version 1.0

Standards fo r Assurance Engagements (C dn)
Areas o f coverage defined b y principles and
criteria, including:
C A business practice disclosure
(including the privacy o f subscriber and
relying party inform ation)
Service integrity
- K e y life cycle m anagem ent controls
- C ertificate life cycle management
controls
Environm ental controls

Standards fo r Attestation Engagements (U .S .)

C ertification authority business activities pre 
defined in principles and criteria
R eport on com pliance w ith W ebTrust for
C ertification A uthorities principles and
criteria

com m unication to interested
parties including business partners,
existing/potential customers
M andatory coverage as noted below
N e w standard fo r reporting activities o f
certification authorities

A uditor

A IC P A /C IC A
Authorities

This document analyzes the form and content o f reviews and reports performed under the indicated regulations indicating appropriate similarities and
differences. For third-party reporting with respect to certification authorities, the most appropriate and relevant approach is to use the AICPA/CICA
Certification Authority (CA) Trust approach wherever possible since it has been developed specifically around the reportable business activities of an
organization acting as a certification authority.

Appendix E - Comparison of CICA Section 5900, AICPA SAS 70 and AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Reports
Covering the Business Activities of Certification Authority Organizations

Acceptable alternatives
Point in tim e (controls placed
operation)
Period o f tim e (determ ined by client)

Acceptable alternatives
Point in tim e (fo r design and existence)
Period o f tim e (determ ined by client)

WebTrustfor Certification Authorities
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based on engagement.

based on the engagement

in

w hich

o f control objectives and
procedures subjectively determ ined b y auditor

Period of Coverage of
Review

A IC P A /C IC A

Adequacy

o f control objectives and
procedures subjectively determ ined by auditor

Adequacy
to

provides

linked

industry

u n ifo rm

accepted

standards

Version 1.0

Continuous coverage fro m the point o f
qualification. Q ualification after compliance
can be tested over a m in im u m ninety-day
period.
T h en updates w ith in a specified
period (currently under debate w hether this
w ould be six months or annual or some other)

standards.

are

IS O fo r international standardization.

standard w hich is intended to be submitted to

part o f a specific review

as

A n y linkage w ould need to be established

as

A n y linkage w ould need to be established
part o f a specific review

Linkage to
Authoritative
Standards

AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification
Authorities
Principles and criteria linked to A N S I X 9 .7 9

AICPA SAS No. 70

CICA Section 5900

Content/Approach

